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Procedure invariance is a basic assumption of rational theories of choice, however, it 
has been shown to be violated: Different response modes, or task frames, sometimes 
reveal opposite preferences. This study focused on selection and rejection task frames, 
involving a unique type of problem with enriched and impoverished options, which has 
led to conflicting findings and theoretical explanations. On the one hand, greater 
preference has been found for the enriched option in the selection task than in the 
rejection task; this result is explained by a compatibility account, in which the positive 
features of the enriched option are more compatible with the selection task and the 
negative features with the rejection task (Shafir, 1993). On the other hand, it has been 
found that this preference difference in the two tasks interacts with the relative 
attractiveness of the two options: The enriched option is preferred more (less) often in 
the selection task than in the rejection task when it is more (less) attractiveness than the 
impoverished option; this finding is attributed to the accentuation of difference 
between options in the selection task, as stated in the accentuation account (Wedell, 
1997). 
xi 
My dissertation focused on examining the role of task frame in human decision 
making by distinguishing the compatibility and accentuation accounts, using an 
information-processing approach. Experiment 1 was conducted online on introductory 
psychology class students, with a plain statement for the task (either a selection or a 
rejection task). A large difference between the two task frames (i.e., the task framing 
effect) was found as predicted by the accentuation account. In Experiment 2, 
participants were recruited from the same subject pool but were required to verbalize 
their thoughts while performing the same tasks in a laboratory. No difference between 
the two task frames in the choice data was found in this experiment, possibly due to the 
need for verbalization of reasons in Experiment 2 or participants’ confusion about the 
rejection task in Experiment 1. With a modified version of the questionnaire conducted 
on both MTurk workers (Experiment 3A) and introductory psychology students 
(Experiment 3B), Experiment 3 emphasized the tasks in several different ways to 
reduce the possible confusion regarding the task, and a similar pattern as in Experiment 
1 was evident though with a smaller effect size. Thus, it was established that task 
confusion cannot explain the task framing effect alone.  
Experiment 4 used a judgment task, in which participants were required to rate 
the likelihood of selecting or rejecting an option. It was again found that more 
participants in the negative task did not understand the task correctly before any 
feedback was provided. The ratings from this experiment were used as direct 
attractiveness measures, and a similar task framing effect was found with these 
measures. The finding of task framing effect was supported by the data from an eye-
tracking experiment (Experiment 5), in which participants performed the tasks in the 
xii 
lab without being required to verbalize their thoughts. In the last two experiments, 
whether the task framing effect was influenced by time pressure was tested. 
Experiment 6 imposed time limits on participants and required them to respond within 
a short time, whereas Experiment 7 forced participants to wait a certain amount of time 
before they could respond. Both experiments found a task framing effect that did not 
differ from that in Experiment 3A, which indicates that this task framing effect was 
relatively automatic and that it did not take extra time for people to be more 
discriminating in the selection task than in the rejection task.  
The current results are not consistent with the compatibility account, which 
predicts the enriched option always to be preferred more in the selection task. Instead, 
they are more consistent with the accentuation account, which predicts that the 
difference between the two task frames would interact with the relative attractiveness 
of the two options, with people being more discriminating under the selection task 
frame. Based on the current findings, a modified version of the accentuation account, 
explaining the difference between the two task frames in terms of availability of 
cognitive resources, was proposed. The modified accentuation account suggests that 
people are less discriminating in the rejection task because understanding the task per 











The principle of invariance (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986; Tversky, Sattath, & 
Slovic, 1988), which includes description invariance and procedure invariance (Shafir 
& Tversky, 1995; Slovic, 1995), is a basic assumption of rational theories of choice. 
Description and procedure invariance refer to the proposition that people’s preferences 
should be consistent across different presentations of the options and methods of 
elicitation, respectively. These sub-principles of invariance have been shown to be 
violated in human decision making, the former in terms of information presentation 
and the latter in terms of response mode. For instance, the well-known framing effect 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1986) violates description invariance, in which people’s 
preferences are influenced by whether the same problem is presented in a positive or 
negative frame. The current study focused on violation of procedure invariance, in 
which different elicitation methods, or response modes, lead to predictably inconsistent 
preferences. 
Preference Reversal 
One robust phenomenon that violates procedure invariance is preference 
reversal. For example, when faced with two bets, one with large payoff but low 
probability (i.e., the $ bet) and the other with small payoff but high probability (i.e., the 
P bet), participants chose the P bet more often in a choice task but bid a higher price for 
2 
the $ bet in a pricing task (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971, 1973; see also Slovic, 1995). 
Preference reversal has also been found between attractiveness rating and pricing tasks, 
with the P bet given higher rating in attractiveness but $ bet stated a higher price (e.g., 
Rubaltelli, Dickert, & Slovic, 2012; Schkade & Johnson, 1989). These distinct tasks 
involve different information-processing patterns and decision strategies. 
Preference reversal has been established for other problems besides the gambles. 
Tversky et al. (1988) found that participants showed inconsistent preferences when 
performing choice versus matching tasks. In one of their problems, participants were to 
choose between two candidates for a position of production engineer. The scores on 
technical knowledge and human relations were provided for both candidates. 
Participants were told that the technical-knowledge attribute was more important than 
the human-relations attribute. One group of participants was given the two scores of 
each candidate and was to make a choice between the two candidates (i.e., the choice 
task); the other group was given three of the total four scores and was to generate the 
missing score to match the two candidates for the job (i.e., the matching task). In the 
choice task, the chosen candidate was the preferred one; in the matching task, a 
generated score lower than the missing value implied a preference for the candidate 
with the missing value. Tversky et al. found that in the choice task 65% of the 
participants indicated preference for the candidate with a higher score on technical 
knowledge, whereas in the matching task only 34% did so. This choice-matching 
discrepancy (also known as the prominence effect) suggests that the more important 
attribute looms larger in choice than in matching, and that the weightings of the 
attributes depend on the response mode. Tversky et al. proposed a  
3 
contingent-weighting model to explain this finding, in which the trade-offs among 
attributes are contingent on the nature of the response, and “the weighting of inputs is 
enhanced by their compatibility with the output” (p. 371).  
The Compatibility Principle 
The compatibility effect is well known in the human performance literature: 
Performance is better when the stimulus is compatible with the response than when it is 
not (Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990; Proctor & Reeve, 1990). For example, 
when responding to the location of a circle presented on a monitor, responses in the 
same relative location as the stimuli (e.g., a left keypress to a left circle) are faster and 
more accurate than those in the opposite relative location. This finding is called spatial 
stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) effect, which has been investigated widely 
(e.g., Fitts & Deininger, 1954; Proctor & Vu, 2006). More generally, Kornblum et al. 
(1990) proposed the idea of dimensional overlap for the SRC effect, which is defined 
as the degree to which attributes in stimuli and responses are “perceptually, 
structurally, or conceptually” similar. For example, a stimulus set of left and right 
locations has dimensional overlap (or similarity) with a response set of left and right 
keypresses, as well as a stimulus set of “left” and “right” words with that response set. 
Starting from Tversky et al. (1988), the concept of compatibility has been 
brought into the field of human decision making. A similar effect of compatibility 
between stimulus attributes and response mode, or task nature, has also been studied in 
human decision making, though not as extensively as in the field of human 
performance. Similar to the dimensional overlap model (Kornblum et al., 1990), 
Slovic, Griffin, and Tversky (1990) concluded that the features that could enhance the 
4 
compatibility between stimuli and responses include “the use of the same units (e.g., 
grades, ranks), the direction of relations (e.g., whether the correlations between input 
and output variables are positive or negative), and the numerical correspondence (e.g., 
similarity) between the values of input and output variables” (p. 23). The rationale for 
the compatibility effect is that the characteristics of the output tend to put more weights 
on the most compatible features of the input, and incompatibility requires additional 
efforts in mental transformation. Thus, the influence of response modes on the decision 
maker’s preference is explained in terms of their compatibility with stimulus attributes.  
Slovic et al. (1990) tested the compatibility effect with several experiments. In 
one experiment, participants were provided with both market value (in billions of 
dollars) and rank in market value of companies in a previous year, and were to predict 
each company’s market value or rank in the next year. Consistent with the 
compatibility principle, participants who were required to predict market value 
weighted market value more than rank, and those who were to predict the rank 
weighted rank more than market value. In another experiment of Slovic et al., 
participants were asked to predict some students’ performance in a history course, 
based on those students’ letter grade and class rank in two other courses, respectively. 
For participants who made the prediction in terms of letter grade, the course presented 
in letter grade was weighted more than that in class rank, and the opposite was true for 
participants who made the prediction in terms of class rank.  
The compatibility principle also explains preference reversals in experimental 
settings such as in comparison versus evaluation tasks and corresponding features 
(Dhar & Nowlis, 2004; Nowlis & Simonson, 1997). Nowlis and Simonson proposed 
5 
that people’s preferences are affected by whether the task is to compare between the 
alternatives or to evaluate the alternatives individually. Specifically, “comparable” 
attributes such as price are more compatible with comparison tasks (e.g., choice), 
whereas “enriched” attributes such as brand name are more compatible with separate 
evaluation tasks (e.g., purchase likelihood rating), because the comparable attributes 
are easier to compare than the enriched attributes. In an example, there were two 
alternative televisions, TV A with lower price and low-quality brand ($209, 
Magnavox) and B with higher price and high-quality brand ($309, Sony). Participants 
were to choose between two televisions in a choice task and to rate their likelihood of 
purchase for each product in a rating task. Nowlis and Simonson found that TV A was 
preferred more often in the choice task than in the purchase likelihood rating task, 
whereas TV B was preferred more often in the rating than in the choice task.  
In Nowlis and Simonson’s (1997) study, similar preference reversals were also 
found with manipulations preserving the compatibility relation but the reversals 
disappeared when the compatibility relation was removed. The preference reversals 
were found for a low-quality brand product with an additional feature versus a high-
quality brand product without that additional feature, and for a lower-price product 
with inferior country of origin versus a high-price product with superior country of 
origin, with the former alternatives in each pair being preferred more in choice than in 
ratings. The preference reversals also generalized to other types of comparison-based 
task (e.g., strength of preference ratings) and separate evaluation task (e.g., whether to 
purchase), and were eliminated when prices in dollars were replaced with price 
descriptions (e.g., “very high price”), or when brand names were replaced with numeric 
6 
quality ratings. These results support the principle of compatibility that the weighting 
of an attribute is influenced by its compatibility with the preference elicitation task: 
Attributes that produce easy and clear comparisons are more compatible with 
comparison-based tasks, and less comparable attributes are more compatible with 
separate evaluation tasks. 
Selection Versus Rejection Tasks 
As reviewed above, besides the tasks of choice, pricing, rating, and matching 
(e.g., Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971; Tversky et al., 1988), decision tasks have also been 
shown to influence decision-makers’ preferences in terms of letter grade versus of class 
ranks (Slovic et al., 1990), and comparing alternatives versus evaluating alternatives 
individually (Dhar & Nowlis, 2004; Nowlis & Simonson, 1997). Among these tasks, 
one unique pair is selection versus rejection tasks, which are both choice tasks and are 
intuitively complementary (e.g., Lai & Hui, 2006; Meloy & Russo, 2004). People can 
choose from two options by selecting one (and implicitly eliminate the other) or 
rejecting one (and implicitly retain the other). However, studies have shown that these 
two tasks could reveal opposite preferences when the same alternatives are given. 
The Compatibility Account 
Selection and rejection tasks have been shown to be influential especially on 
problems involving attribute valence (e.g., good vs. bad). This influence has been 
explained in terms of the principle of compatibility (e.g., Shafir, 1993). The idea is that 
features are weighted more in a task that is compatible with them: Good features of an 
option have greater influence in a selection than in a rejection task, whereas bad 
features are more important in a rejection than in a selection task. The unevenly 
7 
weighted features in decision process lead to different preferences under these tasks 
even with the same presentation of the options. 
Nagpal and Krishnamurthy (2008) used the compatibility account to explain the 
difficulty in making a decision between two unattractive alternatives compared to that 
between two attractive alternatives. They proposed that the incompatibility between 
the unattractiveness and the selection task leads to greater decision difficulty and 
longer decision time. The compatibility is between the attribute valence and the nature 
of the task, that attractive alternatives are more compatible with a selection task (i.e., “I 
will choose option: A/B”), and unattractive alternatives are more compatible with a 
rejection task (i.e., “I will reject option: A/B”). The selection task requires a relative 
attractiveness judgment, which is incompatible with unattractiveness and leads to 
difficulty in decision making. To resolve this incompatibility, the authors used tasks of 
selecting as well as rejecting one of two options. Decision time, difficulty, effort, and 
motivation were examined as a function of compatibility. In the selection task, 
decisions were faster, easier, less effortful, and required less processing motivation for 
attractive than for unattractive alternatives, and the reverse was found in the rejection 
task.  
In addition, Nagpal and Krishnamurthy’s (2008) Experiment 2 framed the same 
option attributes positively (e.g., “The tint successfully blocks 80% of harmful rays 
from the sun”) or negatively (e.g., “The tint fails to block 20% of harmful rays from the 
sun”), to make them attractive or unattractive, respectively. Similar results were found 
with this manipulation. Although Nagpal and Krishnamurthy’s study did not focus on 
the choice per se, in a later study Krishnamurthy and Nagpal (2010) found the 
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influence of incompatibility on decision makers’ choices when options are presented 
sequentially. The assumption was that incompatibility resulted in effortful processing, 
which causes overweighting of the attributes. Thus, incompatibility induced preference 
for the option when the attributes were positive in a rejection task, and against the 
option when the attributes were negative in a selection task.  
Compatibility can also be elicited by manipulating participants’ goal orientation 
and the nature of the decision task. Chernev (2009) generated a promotion-focus (or 
prevention-focus) goal orientation by instructing participants to write an essay about 
hopes / aspirations (or duties / obligations). One difference between the promotion and 
prevention foci is that the former involves a concern with positive outcomes and the 
latter with negative outcomes. Thus, promotion focus is more compatible with the 
selection task and prevention focus is more compatible with the rejection task. 
Participants were to select or give up one of two options, or to decide by tossing a coin. 
The measurement used was decision confidence, obtained by a subjective rating on a 
10-point scale, and also indicated by the frequency of tossing a coin in each condition. 
Promotion-focused individuals were found to be more confident in the selection task 
than in the rejection task, and the reverse was true for the prevention-focused 
individuals. 
Unlike the above studies involving options that are overall attractive or 
unattractive, some earlier studies focused on the features that compose the options 
being positive or negative, and found more interesting and puzzling results: When 
paired with an option containing average features, an option containing both more  
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positive and more negative features can be preferred to different degrees in a selection 
task than in a rejection task.   
Shafir (1993) examined compatibility between positive and negative features of 
alternatives and the decision task frames (selection and rejection), and proposed that 
positive features are weighted more in the selection task and negative features of the 
options are weighted more in the rejection task. Two types of options were constructed 
and used, the enriched and the impoverished options. The enriched option had more 
positive as well as more negative features than the impoverished one. Shafir found that 
for a selection task in which participants needed to award or indicate a preference for 
one of the options, the enriched option was preferred more than for a rejection task in 
which participants were to deny or give up one of the options.  
As an example, Shafir (1993) included a problem of an only-child sole-custody 
case, for which participants were supposed to serve on the jury to decide to award or  
deny sole custody of the child to which parent: 
 
 
Imagine that you serve on the jury of an only-child sole-custody case 
following a relatively messy divorce. The facts of the case are 
complicated by ambiguous economic, social, and emotional 
considerations, and you decide to base your decision entirely on the 
following few observations. [To which parent would you award sole 




Parent A average income 
average health 
average working hours 
reasonable rapport with the child 
relatively stable social life 
Parent B above-average income 
very close relationship with the child 
extremely active social life 
lots of work-related travel 
minor health problems (p. 549) 
 
 
In this example, Parent B (the enriched option) had more positive as well as more 
negative features than Parent A (the impoverished option). If procedure invariance 
holds, the percentages of each parent being selected and rejected should sum to 100. 
However, Shafir found that when deciding which parent to award sole custody, Parent 
A was chosen (i.e., selected) by 36% of the participants, and Parent B 64%; when 
deciding which parent to deny sole custody, Parent A was chosen (i.e., rejected) by 
45% of the participants, and Parent B 55%. The enriched option Parent B was preferred 
by 64% of the participants in the selection task but was preferred by 45% of the 
participants in the rejection task. The results were consistent with the concept of 
compatibility. The positive features were more compatible with the selection task 
because people seek “good” reasons to select an option, whereas the negative features 
were more compatible with the rejection task because people seek “bad” reasons to 
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reject an option. Thus, the enriched option, which contained more positive as well as 
more negative features, was preferred more often in the selection task than in the 
rejection task. 
The Accentuation Account 
In the following years, Ganzach (1995) and Wedell (1997) followed up Shafir’s 
(1993) study, providing different evidence and alternative accounts. Ganzach proposed 
that people have higher commitment in the selection task than in the rejection task 
because “one has to live with the alternative he accepts, but not with the alternative he 
rejects” (p. 115). With a higher commitment level, people tend to be more critical and 
focus more on the negative attributes of the options. Ganzach’s Experiment 2 included 
a filler option, which was clearly not the intended answer and thus can be ignored in 
the current discussion, in addition to two experimental options similar to the enriched 
and impoverished options in Shafir’s study. Participants were required to select or 
reject a job candidate out of each triplet. Contradictory with Shafir’s results, Ganzach 
found that the enriched options were preferred more in the rejection task than in the 
selection task (see also Carlson & Bond, 2006). 
Wedell (1997) proposed an accentuation account to explain both data sets from 
Shafir’s (1993) and Ganzach’s (1995) studies. Wedell noted that the overall 
attractiveness of the enriched options was generally higher than the impoverished 
options in Shafir’s study, and the opposite was true in Ganzach’s study (See Figure 1). 
According to the accentuation account, people are more discriminating and differences 
between alternatives are accentuated more in the selection task than in the rejection 
task. This difference is due to the assumptions that (1) there is greater commitment or 
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need for justification in the selection task than in the rejection task and (2) justification 
requires discriminating and accentuating the differences between the options. Thus, 
when the overall attractiveness of one option is greater than that of the other option, 
participants’ preferences for the more attractive option will be higher in the selection 
task than in the rejection task.  
Wedell (1997) first analyzed the data from Shafir (1993) and Ganzach (1995), 
by plotting the “proportion preferring enriched” against the “overall proportion 
preferring enriched” to show the relation between them in the selection and rejection 
tasks separately. The “proportion preferring enriched” refers to the percentage the 
enriched option being selected in the selection task or it not being rejected in the 
rejection task, whereas the “overall proportion preferring enriched” refers to the 
average of the above two values and serves as a measure for the relative attractiveness 
of the enriched option. The combined data set showed a deeper slope for the selection-
task line compared to the rejection-task line, meaning the selection task was affected by 
the relative attractiveness of options more than was the rejection task.  
Wedell (1997) then conducted two experiments to verify the accentuation 
account directly. In his Experiment 1, which was with a similar design as the current 
study, 26 preference problems similar to those used by Shafir (1993) were presented to 
participants in either the selection or rejection frame. The problems were constructed 
so that the overall proportion of the enriched option being preferred was spreading 
from 30% to 70%. These new data showed the same pattern as the combined data from 
the previous two studies, in which the data pattern were similar to Shafir’s results when 
the enriched option was more attractive and consistent with Ganzach’s (1995) results 
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when the impoverished option was more attractive. These results were consistent with 
the accentuation model that people are more discriminating in the selection than in the 
rejection task: Compared with the rejection task, people in the selection task prefer the 
more attractive option more often and the less attractive option less often. 
Information-Processing Approach 
The information-processing approach has been proposed to “focus on the 
processes of judgment and choice and use various methods to trace decision 
processing” (Payne & Bettman, 2004, p. 111; see also Glaholt & Reingold, 2011). 
These process-tracing methods include but are not limited to: Verbal protocols (e.g., 
Meloy & Russo, 2004; Nowlis & Simonson, 1997; Payne, 1976), monitoring of 
information search (e.g., eye-movement tracking; Rubaltelli et al., 2012; computerized 
information retrieval systems; Edwards & Fasolo, 2001), and response times (e.g., 
Bettman, Johnson, & Payne, 1990; Nagpal & Krishnamurthy, 2008). These methods 
emphasize how the decisions are made rather than just what the final decisions are.  
Verbal Protocols 
Verbal protocols are self-reports of participants’ on-going decision-making 
processes, although they may influence the processes (Brand, Reimer, & Opwis, 2003; 
Hertzum & Holmegaard, 2015). Verbal protocols can provide the level of details and 
insights that are not provided by eye-tracking and other types of process markers 
(Payne, Braunstein, & Carroll, 1978; Russo, Johnson, & Stephens, 1989). Two 
common types of verbal protocol methods are concurrent protocols (while preforming 
the task) and retrospective protocols (upon completion of the task). Both methods have 
advantages and disadvantages (Kuusela & Pallab, 2000; Peute, de Keizer, & Jaspers, 
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2015; Whyte, Cormier, & Pickett-Hauber, 2010)): Concurrent protocols may alter the 
accuracy of the tasks (Hertzum & Holmegaard, 2015), whereas retrospective protocols 
could induce forgetting even with cues of the stimuli or responses (Russo et al., 1989) 
and result in evaluation of the task rather than recall of thoughts during the task 
(Gonzalez, 2003). 
As an example for the use of verbal protocols in a study of task framing, Meloy 
and Russo (2004) used the concurrent verbal protocol method in examining the 
compatibility between decision frame (selection or rejection) and the valence of the 
alternatives (positive or negative). They created alternatives composed of only positive 
or negative features, so that selecting between the two positive alternatives or rejecting 
between the two negative alternatives were compatible conditions, and selecting 
between negative alternatives and rejecting between positive alternatives were 
incompatible conditions. Meloy and Russo found that task reframing (e.g., 
transforming a selection task into a rejection task) revealed by the verbal protocol data 
occurred more often in the incompatible conditions than in the compatible conditions. 
Eye-Movement Tracking 
Eye-tracking data can be used to reveal the decision maker’s information search 
processing, and are less intrusive than other process-tracing methods such as 
information boards and mouse-tracing methods (Glöckner & Herbold, 2011; Orquin & 
Loose, 2013; Scholz, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2015). Typical measures in the 
decision making studies are: Number of fixations as a measure of cognitive effort or 
amount of information search; mean fixation duration as a measure for processing 
depth or effort; number of fixations and total fixation as measures for level of attention; 
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sequence of fixations as a measure of processing or information search pattern 
(Glöckner & Herbold, 2011; Kang & Landry, 2014; Rubaltelli et al., 2012; 
Venkatraman, Payne, & Huettel, 2014).  
Regarding task framing, Rubaltelli et al.’s (2012) collected eye-tracking data 
from participants performing both an attractiveness rating task and a pricing task for 
different gambles problems. More fixations were found on the payoffs than on the 
associated probabilities in a pricing task, whereas the amount of fixations was similar 
on both the payoffs and the probabilities in an attractiveness-rating task. This result 
pattern is consistent with the assumption that the pricing task is more compatible with 
the payoffs of the options and the rating task is more compatible with the probabilities. 
Kuo et al. (2009) explored how the level of cognitive effort involved in decisions was 
influenced by positive and negative framing. Note that the framing was in terms of the 
information framing of the question (e.g., 200 people will be saved vs. 400 people will 
die) rather than the task framing. Total time spent and number of eye fixations on each 
problem were used as measures of cognitive effort. These eye-movement measures 
showed that participants expended more effort on the problems under the negative 
framing than under the positive framing. The rationale was that the positive and 
negative framing elicited positive and negative emotion, respectively, which exert 
different levels of cognitive effort in information processing (i.e., more negative 
emotion leads to higher motivation). 
Decision Time 
“Response time can provide insights into the process of deliberation prior to 
making a decision” (Rubinstein, 2013). The response time approach has been used 
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especially when different theories have identical predictions of the outcome (choice) 
data but predict different decision-making processes that lead to different response 
times (e.g., Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007; Glöckner, 2007). For example, Nagpal and 
Krishnamurthy (2008) used decision time as one of the dependent variables, and found 
that time of processing was affected by the compatibility between task frame and 
valence of options: Decisions for attractive options were faster than those for 
unattractive options in a selection task, and the reverse was true for a rejection task. 
They proposed that the incompatibility between the (un)attractiveness and the decision 
task leads to longer decision time. 
Time and effort go hand in hand. Decision time has been used as a measure of 
decision effort (Bettman et al., 1990; Bettman & Zins, 1979; Hoyer, 1984). Hoyer 
studied consumers’ behavior on relatively unimportant and repeated purchases, using 
an in-person observation method. The observer recorded the amount of time taken and 
number of within-brand and cross-brand comparisons made by the consumers before 
they bought a certain brand of laundry detergent. On average it took the consumers 13 
s to make a purchase decision, and most of them only examined one or two products 
before their final purchase choice. Hoyer concluded that “the typical consumer is 
making an extremely quick decision with only a minimal degree of cognitive effort in 
the store environment” (p. 826).  
Bettman et al. (1990) used decision times (i.e., latencies) and self-reported task 
difficulty as measures for the effort required when using different decision strategies. 
They proposed a model of effort using weighted elementary information processes 
(EIPs) for describing strategies. The proposed model provided good fits when decision 
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times and self-reported effort were used as an indicator of effort, respectively, and the 
weighted EIPs model fit better especially on decision times. Time spent and the self-
reported effort were not perfectly correlated, but decision time was a relatively 
preferred measure because people may not be able to subjectively report their cognitive 
effort accurately.  
Influence of Time Pressure 
In reality, people sometimes need to make decisions under time pressure. For 
example, a person may need to decide which stock(s) to buy or to sell in a timely 
manner (Nursimulu & Bossaerts, 2014). Decision making is sensitive to time pressure 
(Slovic, 1995; Suter & Hertwig, 2011). There is evidence that people may use different 
information-processing strategies, speed up the information processing with the same 
strategies (Ordóñez & Benson, 1997), or change the decision criterion (Diederich, 
2003) under time pressure than when decision speed is not critical. For example, under 
time pressure, people may attend more to general category information about the 
problem (Maule, Hockey, & Bdzola, 2000) or concentrate on more important attributes 
and relevant information (Edland, 1993).  
Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, and Johnson (2000) retested a common finding 
that risk and benefit of an activity are inversely related in people’s mind despite the 
fact that they are positively related in the physical world. This finding was proposed to 
be due to the overall affective evaluation of the activity (see also Slovic, Peters, 
Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005). Participants were required to rate the risk and benefit 
of various targets either with or without time pressure. This negative correlation 
between perceived risk and benefit was found to become stronger when the participants 
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were under time pressure. Finucane et al. concluded that time pressure reduced the 
analytic processes and increased the reliance on affective processes in this type of 
risk/benefit judgment.  
Present Study 
The seemingly conflicting finding that the same option is preferred to different 
degrees under the selection and rejection task frames is interesting because it is a 
violation of procedure invariance, which is a crucial component in theories of rational 
decision. The different result patterns and theoretical explanations provided by Shafir 
(1993) and Wedell (1997) deserve further examination. Note that both accounts 
emphasize the importance of the decision tasks, though in different manners. 
According to the compatibility account, the relation between the valence of features in 
the options and the nature of the tasks is the crucial factor that leads to changes in 
preference across the tasks, especially when the two options are otherwise comparable. 
According to the accentuation account, changes in preferences in the two tasks, which 
have different levels of need for justification, depend on the relative attractiveness of 
the two options, and the more (less) attractive option is preferred more (less) in the 
selection task because people have more commitment involved under this task frame. 
Despite its significance, this discrepancy has been ignored in the decision-
making literature, along with little attention being paid to the compatibility principle in 
the field. As of May 29, 2015, Shafir’s (1993) study has been cited 152 times in 
PsycINFO, whereas Wedell’s (1997) article, which proposed the conflict, has been 
cited only 15 times. Among the latter citations, only two articles discussed this 
discrepancy, one of which supported the compatibility account (Meloy & Russo, 2004) 
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but the other of which suggested evidence in favor of the accentuation account 
(Colombo, Nicotra, & Marino, 2002). Rather than the actual choice made by 
participants, Meloy and Russo focused on the commitment to the chosen alternative 
(measured by a certainty rating on the final choice made), accentuation of attribute 
difference (measured by how much the evaluation of the alternatives deviate from the 
midpoint on a 9-point scale), and predecisional distortion of information (measured by 
comparing the ratings from the participants who were required to make a choice to 
those who did not need to make a choice). Colombo et al. used a small number of 
participants (34 or 36 participants in each condition) and only included problems in 
which the overall preference of the enriched option was lower than .50.  
 The present study was motivated by this issue to revisit the enriched-
impoverished paradigm, with the aim of investigating how decision task frame 
influences preferences. The goal was to test the compatibility and accentuation 
accounts, and to propose an alternative account to explain the results if necessary. The 
compatibility account and accentuation account provide different insights into the role 
of task frame. The former suggests that selection and rejection tasks influence decision 
making by putting more weights on the features compatible with the task, and the latter 
proposes that people are discriminating in the selection task due to higher level of 
commitment. These different views were supported by data from Shafir (1993) and 
Wedell (1997), respectively. Thus, to understand how indeed the selection and 
rejection task frames function or which of the two accounts captures the role of task 
frame correctly, the result pattern in previous studies needs to be verified. In all the 
current experiments, there were 30 problems in total: the 26 problems used by Wedell, 
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three of which were also used by Shafir, in addition to four new gamble problems that 
are similar to the gamble problems used by Shafir.  
In general, the primary measures in the experiments include the choices 
participants made, the verbal protocols, and eye-movement data. In addition, response 
time, satisfaction level, and confidence level were also compared across the two task 
frames for the 30 problems. The comparison results can be informative for examining 
how task frames influence choices and information-search patterns, and which task 
frame is superior by saving more time, leading to more satisfaction, and/or yielding 
more confidence. 
Experiment 1 was conducted online with the 30 problems on introductory 
psychology students through Sona (purdue-psych.sona-systems.com), and participants 
performed either a selection or rejection task on all the problems. Following each 
problem, participants were required to rate their satisfaction and confidence regarding 
the choice they just made. A pattern that was similar to Wedell’s (1997) results 
predicted by the accentuation account was obtained: Participants were more 
discriminating in the selection than in the rejection task as indicated by a deeper 
regression line in the selection task. 
Experiment 2 applied a verbal protocol method in a laboratory setting. 
Participants worked on the same 30 problems while being required to verbally report 
their thoughts during decision making. Surprisingly, the choice data showed no 
difference under the two task frames, possibly due to the need for verbalization of 
reasons for their choices or to the finding that more than half participants in the 
rejection task were confused about the task at the beginning of the experiment. The 
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verbal-protocol data showed that participants in both tasks mentioned the positive 
features roughly the same, but the negative features were mentioned more in the 
rejection task than in the selection task, consistent with the compatibility account. The 
need for verbalization of the reasons promoted the strategy that fits with the 
compatibility account, which is a reason-based approach to understanding decisions 
(Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993). 
The questionnaires in Experiment 3 were modified based on those used in 
Experiment 1 to make the task requirements clearer. This experiment was conducted on 
Sona as well as on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk, www.mturk.com) to obtain data 
from different participant populations. The difference between the two task frames was 
smaller than that in Experiment 1, but was still evident. The results indicated that task 
confusion may have contributed to the non-task-framing effect in Experiment 2, but it 
was not the whole story. Thus, in Experiment 2 the need for verbalization of reasons 
reduced the difference in choice between the two task frames, and Experiment 3 
confirmed the result pattern that supports the accentuation account. 
Experiment 4 obtained the relative attractiveness of the two options in each 
problems directly by requiring participants to rate the likelihood they would 
select/reject an option. This relative attractiveness rating is highly correlated with the 
overall proportion preferring the options used in previous experiments. All data in 
previous experiments were reanalyzed with these new attractiveness ratings and similar 
result patterns were found. 
Experiment 5 utilized the eye-tracking technique to collect participants’ eye-
movement patterns in a laboratory setting. The purpose was to evaluate how 
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participants search information under different task frames, and to seek patterns that fit 
with one of the two accounts.  Not much difference in the eye movements was found 
between the task frames, but a measure for cognitive effort (i.e., average fixation 
duration) showed more cognitive effort was involved in the rejection task than in the 
selection task. The choice data once again were consistent with the accentuation 
account, although the eye-movement data indicated that the difference between the two 
tasks was due to the rejection task being more effortful. 
Experiments 6 and 7 included time constraints in an MTurk experiment similar 
to Experiment 3. Participants in Experiment 6 were required to respond within a time 
limit for each problem, and participants in Experiment 7 were not able to respond 
before a period of time. The result patterns in the last two experiments turned out to be 
similar to the pattern obtained in Experiment 3, which indicates that the accentuation 








EXPERIMENT 1. ONLINE CHOICE TASK ON SONA 
 
 
The purpose of this experiment was to verify the result pattern of how task 
framing influences people’s preferences, that is, to examine whether the result pattern 
of Wedell (1997; in support of the accentuation account) or Shafir (1993; in support of 
the compatibility account), or a new result pattern, was obtained in the current 
experiment setting. On the one hand, if the compatibility account explains the task 
framing effect, the enriched option will be preferred more often in the selection task 
(i.e., being selected) than in the rejection task (i.e., not being rejected), and this 
difference will not be influenced by the relative attractiveness of the two options. On 
the other hand, if the accentuation account holds, the more attractive option, regardless 
of whether it is enriched or impoverished, will be preferred more in the selection task 
than in the rejection task. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 250 (99 female) Purdue University undergraduate students 
who participated for experimental credits in an introductory psychology course. The 
average age was 19.4 (± 1.1) years old. 
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Apparatus and Stimuli 
The experimental task was composed of 30 binary-choice problems regarding 
different scenarios in daily life, such as choosing a restaurant, university, and daycare 
(see Appendix C). These problems were adapted from those used by Wedell (1997) 
and some by Shafir (1993). Each problem had two options, an enriched option and an 
impoverished option. The enriched option contained both very positive and very 
negative features, and the impoverished option contained similar, but more average 
features.  
The problems were constructed and presented by Qualtrics 
(https://purdue.qualtrics.com). The order of the problems was randomly assigned to 
each participant. When presenting the problems, general information regarding the 
scenario and the decision task was presented on top of the page, and the two options 
were presented side-by-side below the general information. In this experiment, the 
enriched option was always presented to the left of the impoverished option. The 
features were presented in the same order in both options so that a feature in the 
enriched option was in the same line as that feature in the impoverished option. 
However, the order of the features within each option was counterbalanced across 
participants: In the enriched option the positive features were presented above the 
negative features for half of the participants, and the reversed feature order was used 
for the other half of the participants; in the impoverished option, the features were 
presented in the same order as those in the enriched option. 
The decision task was either a selection or a rejection task, and participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the task frames. In the selection task, participants 
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were to select the more favorable option, and in the rejection task the participants were 
to reject the less favorable option. The scenarios in the rejection tasks were similar to 
those in the selection tasks, but were worded to indicate that a “rejection” (e.g., return 
an extra computer) was needed. 
Following each problem were two questions “How satisfied are you with the 
decision you just made?” and “How confident are you about the choice you just 
made?” The answers for both questions were 10-point, with 1 meaning “very 
dissatisfied” or “very unconfident”, and 10 meaning “very satisfied” and “very 
confident”.  
Design and Procedure 
Participants were given a link to the online questionnaire once they signed up 
for the experiment through an experiment registration system (Sona; purdue-
psych.sona-systems.com), and they were randomly assigned to one of four between-
subjects conditions based on a combination of feature order (positive-to-negative vs. 
negative-to-positive) and task frame (selection vs. rejection).  
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were instructed to minimize 
the background noise or distraction in the environment and were told, “You will be 
presented with a number of problems, for each of which you need to choose an option. 
Please take as much time as you need.” Each problem was presented on a single page, 
followed by a second page containing the satisfaction and confidence questions. 
Participants needed to click on a “next” button located on the right bottom of the page 
to proceed to the next page, and were not able to go back to the previous pages. The 
time to submit the first page of each problem (i.e., to complete the selection or rejection 
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task) was recorded by Qualtrics, but participants were not informed of this timing 
recording, and they were allowed as much time as they needed to work on the 
problems. A statement “You have completed [x] of 30 questions” with [x] referring to 
the number of completed problems was shown below the “next” button. After 
completing all 30 problems, participants were instructed to send a randomly generated 
code to the experimenter by email in order to get the experimental credit. 
Results 
Outlier Trials 
All participants were included in the following analyses. To improve the quality 
of the data, lower and upper cutoffs for response time (RT, i.e., time to complete each 
problem) were used. The lower cutoff for RT was determined based on the reading 
speed of an average adult 
(http://www.humanfactors.com/newsletters/human_interaction_speeds.asp), which is 
around 250 to 300 words per minute. For each problem, the assumption for the fastest 
possible speed was that the participants were reading with the fastest average speed of 
300 words per minute, and were only reading the two options in the problem. For 
example, if a problem has x words in the problem title, y words in option A, and z 
words in option B, then the lower cutoff for this problem is (y + z)/300*60 seconds. 
Note that this cutoff is relatively conservative so that not too many data were excluded 
from the analyses. A higher cutoff was set arbitrarily at 500 ms, the purpose of which 
was to exclude occasional long trials. These two cutoffs excluded 24.1% of the total 
trials, which may be due to participants not paying enough attention to the task or 
submitting the page accidently. Mean and standard deviation of the remaining trials 
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were calculated for each problem in the selection and rejection tasks separately, and an 
M ± 3SD cutoff was used to further clean the data, which excluded additional 1.7% of 
the total trials.  
Choice Data 
The percentage of selecting or rejecting an option was then computed for each 
problem by averaging across the participants. The overall proportion of the enriched 
option being preferred was computed in the same way as in Wedell (1997, Experiment 
1), by aggregating proportions of the enriched option being preferred in the selection 
and rejection tasks (i.e., the percentage of an enriched option being selected and that of 
the corresponding impoverished option being rejected).  
The proportions preferring the enriched option in the selection and rejection 
tasks were plotted against the overall proportion of the enriched option being preferred 
to form two regression lines. An overlap between the two lines representing the 
selection and rejection tasks would indicate that there was no influence of the task 
frame. Otherwise, the compatibility account predicts the selection line to be higher than 
the rejection line and the two lines to be parallel; in contrast, the accentuation account 
predicts a crossover of the two lines, with the selection line having a steeper slope than 
the rejection line (see Figure 2).  
The results showed a similar pattern (see Figure 3) to that predicted by the 
accentuation account. The overall proportion preferring the enriched option explains a 
significant amount of the variance in the proportion preferring the enriched option for 
both the selection task, F(1, 28) = 584.48, p < .001, R2 = .977, R2Adjusted = .953, and the 
rejection task, F(1, 28) = 167.11, p < .001, R2 = .925, R2Adjusted = .851. The coefficients 
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of the two regression functions were significant, for both the selection task, Beta = 
1.304, t(29) = 24.18, p < .001, and the rejection task, Beta = 0.697, t(29) = 12.93, p 
< .001. The coefficients were 1.20 and 0.82 for the selection and reject tasks, 
respectively, for Wedell’s (1997) data. More important, the difference between the two 
coefficients was also significant, t(29) = 7.96, p < .001. 
Note that the two regression lines were not independent and the sum of the two 
regression coefficients was always 2. This dependence was because the overall 
proportion preferring the enriched option (i.e., the x axis) was an average of the values 
on the two lines representing the selection and rejection tasks. Later, in Experiment 4, a 
direct measure of the relative attractiveness of the enriched option was obtained and 
used as the x axis. Using this new measure made the two lines independent, yet the 
new regression lines looked similar to the original ones (see the bottom panels in 
Figures 2, 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13). 
Decision Time 
The mean time to complete each problem, recorded as the time used to submit 
each page, was used for the timing analysis. A repeated-measures ANOVA was 
conducted on the decision time with task frame (selection vs. rejection), feature order 
(positive-negative vs. negative-positive) as within-subject variables. There were main 
effects of task frame (Ms = 25.21 vs. 27.88 s for selection and rejection tasks, 
respectively), F(1, 29) = 27.87, p < .001, ηp
2 = .49, and feature order (Ms = 25.00 vs. 
28.08 s for the positive-negative and negative-positive feature orders, respectively), 
F(1, 29) = 45.69, p < .001, ηp
2 = .61, but no significant interaction between these two 
variables, F(1, 29) = .02, p = .882, ηp
2 = .00.  
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Subjective Ratings 
Similar ANOVAs were conducted on the satisfaction and confidence ratings 
following each choice problem. Across all the experiments in the current study, the 
results regarding the effect of task frame on these subjective ratings were not 
consistent, so these data are put in Appendix D.  
Discussion 
First of all, the current experiment showed a difference in the selection and 
rejection tasks, confirming a task framing effect. It is straightforward, and shown by 
the positive slopes of both the selection and rejection lines in Figure 1, that the 
proportion of one option being preferred in either task should be positively correlated 
to the relative attractiveness of this option (indicated by the overall proportion of this 
option being preferred in both tasks). Yet, the option was preferred more in the 
selection than in the rejection task if it had high attractiveness, and preferred less in the 
selection than in the rejection task if it had a low attractiveness. In other words, the 
relative attractiveness had a more profound effect in the selection task than in the 
rejection task, that is, people are more discriminating in the selection task.  
In binary-choice tasks, the selection and rejection tasks were logically 
complimentary, by which different framings of one problem should lead to the same 
preference of the decision maker. The current experiment violated this principle of 
procedure invariance. Moreover, the results in this experiment were consistent with the 
accentuation account proposed by Wedell (1997). The accentuation account claims that 
people have higher commitment level in the selection task than in the rejection task, 
and thus accentuate the difference more in the selection task. The accentuated 
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differences are reflected by selecting the more attractive option more and the less 
attractive option less in the selection task.  
In addition, the decision times were shorter in the selection task than those in 
the rejection task. In other words, the selection task frame took less time while people 
managed to be more discriminating. These results imply that the selection task frame 
may be a “superior” task frame for people to make decision. So if people have “real” 









EXPERIMENT 2. IN-LAB CHOICE TASK WITH VERBAL PROTOCOLS 
 
 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to investigate how participants make a 
certain choice and what their information-processing patterns are under the selection 
and rejection tasks. Both the accentuation account and the compatibility account are 
aimed at explaining the underlying decision-making processes, yet Experiment 1 and 
previous studies (Ganzach, 1995; Shafir, 1993; Wedell, 1997) all focus on the decision 
outcomes under different task frames. Thus, more process-tracing data is needed to 
directly reveal the underlying processes that make a difference under the two task 
frames. Experiment 2 used the method of concurrent verbal protocols (or “think 
aloud”), which has been used to uncover people’s thoughts while performing a certain 
task. To complement the outcome data from Experiment 1, this experiment was 
conducted in a laboratory setting to obtain detailed data on people’s thoughts as to how 
and why they make the decisions.  
Method 
Participants 
Forty-one (13 females; average age 19.7 ± 1.4) Purdue University 
undergraduate students participated for experimental credits in an introductory 
psychology course. These students did not participate in Experiment 1. 
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Apparatus and Stimuli 
The apparatus and stimuli were similar to Experiment 1 except that participants 
were invited to the lab, and the experiment was conducted on a computer located in a 
quiet cubicle. 
Design and Procedure 
The design and procedure were similar to Experiment 1 except that the 
researcher sat in the cubicle next to the participant, and the participant was required to 
“think aloud” during the experiment. Participants were told, “Please speak out your 
thoughts while working on these problems. You will be reminded by the experimenter 
if you have kept silent for more than 30 s.” This 30-s cutoff was adopted from the 
methods in Hertzum and Holmegaard (2015). They were also encouraged to focus on 
how and why they make the decisions. Participants’ vocal responses were recorded 
with their permission. Half of the auditory recording of one participant was missing 
due to a failure of the recording device. All the remaining auditory recordings were 
transcribed by the researcher and two undergraduate research assistants. The transcripts 
were then coded separately by the same two undergraduate researchers, who were 
naive to the purpose of the study.  
Results 
All participants were included in the following analyses, except one who 
ignored the instruction and did not report verbally as required. Half of the remaining 40 





The regression lines were plotted using the same method as in Experiment 1. 
The overall proportion preferring the enriched option explains a significant amount of 
the variance in the proportion preferring the enriched option in both the selection task, 
F(1, 28) = 83.52, p < .001, R2 = .865, R2Adjusted = .740, and the rejection task, F(1, 28) = 
77.00, p < .001, R2 = .856, R2Adjusted = .724. The coefficients of the two regression 
functions were significant, for both the selection task, Beta = 1.036, t(29) = 9.14, p 
< .001, and the rejection task, Beta = 1.002, t(29) = 8.78, p < .001. Different from 
Experiment 1, the difference between the two coefficients was not significant, t(29) 
= .21, p = .834. The lines for the selection and rejection tasks were almost overlapped 
entirely with each other (see Figure 4), indicating that there was no difference between 
the two task frames in terms of which choice participants made. 
Decision Time 
Treating each problem as an experimental unit, repeated-measure ANOVAs 
were conducted on decision time, satisfaction rating, and confidence rating, with task 
frame (selection vs. rejection) and feature order (positive-negative vs. negative-
positive) as within-subject variables.  
There were significant main effects of task frame (Ms = 44.87 vs. 51.03 s for 
selection and rejection tasks, respectively), F(1, 29) = 91.89, p < .001, ηp
2 = .76, and 
feature order (Ms = 49.05 and 46.85 s for positive-negative and negative-positive 
feature orders, respectively), F(1, 29) = 6.33, p = .018, ηp
2 = .18, and an interaction 
between them, F(1, 29) = 10.77, p = .003, ηp
2 = .27. The selection task took longer for 
the positive-negative feature order than for the negative-positive feature order (Ms = 
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47.34 vs. 42.39 s), whereas the rejection task did not show a similar difference due to 
the feature order (Ms = 50.77 vs. 51.30 s). 
Participant-Based Verbal Protocol Data 
The verbal protocol data were transcribed by the researcher and two 
undergraduate research assistants word-by-word. Then the two research assistants, who 
were naive to the purpose of this study, coded the transcripts for each problem and for 
each participant. For each problem, they generated four ratings for whether the 
participant mentioned (coded as 1) the positive or negative features of the enriched or 
impoverished option or not (coded as 0). The research assistants were instructed to 
code the data independently based on their own understanding of the transcripts. The 
ratings of the two assistants were highly correlated, Pearson’s r = .950, n = 160, p 
< .001, and the average of the two sets of ratings were used in subsequent analyses.  
For each participant, four data points were obtained by aggregating data across 
all problems and were used in the following analysis: the frequency of the 
positive/negative features mentioned in the enriched/impoverished options. A repeated-
measure ANOVA was conducted with (positive vs. negative) feature and (enriched vs. 
impoverished) option as within-subject variables, and (selection vs. rejection) task as a 
between-subject variable. (Feature order did not have any significant effect and thus 
was not included as a factor in the analysis.) There were significant main effects of 
feature (Ms = 15.8 vs. 10.8 for positive and negative features, respectively), F(1, 38) = 
96.12, p < .001, ηp
2 = .72, and option type (Ms = 16.6 vs. 10.0 for enriched and 
impoverished options, respectively), F(1, 38) = 154.07, p < .001, ηp
2 = .80. There were 
also significant interactions between feature and task (positive features were mentioned 
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roughly equally for both the selection and rejection tasks, Ms = 16.0 vs. 15.6, but 
negative features were mentioned more in the rejection task than in the selection task, 
Ms = 11.8 vs. 9.5; see Figure 5 top), F(1, 38) = 7.21, p = .011, ηp
2 = .16, and between 
feature and option type (the difference between enriched and impoverished options was 
smaller for the positive features, Ms = 18.1 vs. 13.5, than for the negative features, Ms 
= 15.1 vs. 6.4; see Figure 6 top), F(1, 38) = 11.37, p = .002, ηp
2 = .23. No other effects 
were significant, ps > .110. 
Problem-Based Verbal Protocol Data 
Problem-based analysis showed a similar pattern except that the difference 
between the selection and rejection tasks was significant. 
In this analysis, each problem was treated as an experimental unit. For each 
problem, eight data points were obtained by aggregating data across all participants and 
used in the following analysis: the frequency of the positive/negative features 
mentioned in the enriched/impoverished options for the selection/rejection tasks. A 
repeated-measure ANOVA was conducted with (positive vs. negative) feature, 
(enriched vs. impoverished) option, and (selection vs. rejection) task as variables. 
There were significant main effects of feature (Ms = 10.5 vs. 7.2 for positive and 
negative features, respectively), F(1, 29) = 180.32, p < .001, ηp
2 = .86, option type (Ms 
= 11.1 vs. 6.6 for enriched and impoverished options, respectively), F(1, 29) = 67.42, p 
< .001, ηp
2 = .70, and task (Ms = 8.5 vs. 9.2 for selection and rejection tasks, 
respectively), F(1, 29) = 11.76, p = .002, ηp
2 = .29.  
There were also significant interactions between feature and task (positive 
features were mentioned roughly equally for both the selection and rejection tasks, Ms 
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= 10.6 vs. 10.4, but negative features were mentioned more in the rejection task than in 
the selection task, Ms = 8.0 vs. 6.4; see Figure 5 bottom), F(1, 29) = 23.15, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .44, and between feature and option (the difference between enriched and 
impoverished options was smaller for the positive features, Ms = 12.0 vs. 9.0, than for 
the negative features, Ms = 10.1 vs. 4.3; see Figure 6 bottom), F(1, 29) = 5.23, p 
= .030, ηp
2 = .15. No other effects were significant, ps > .139. 
To compute how much the participants considered the features of the enriched  
option relative to the features of the impoverished option, the relative weights  
 
 
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
      
 
 
were used, where EO represents enriched option and IO represents impoverished 
option.  The relative weights for positive/negative features in the selection and 
rejection tasks were plotted against the relative attractiveness of the enriched options 
obtained in Experiment 4 (see later). Figure 7 shows that the positive features seem to 
have a greater effect in the selection task (comparison between the solid vs. dashed 
black lines) and the negative features seem to have a greater effect in the rejection task 
(comparison between the solid vs. dashed red lines), but these differences were not 
statistically significant, ts < 1.  
Discussion 
In Experiment 2, participants were invited to the lab and to “think aloud” while 
they were performing the same task as participants in Experiment 1. The choice data 
from these participants showed no difference between the selection and rejection tasks 
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– people were equally discriminating under both task frames. The participants from 
both experiments were from the same participant pool, yet they showed very different 
result patterns in terms of the choice preferences. There are two possible reasons why 
the result pattern in this experiment differed from that in Experiment 1. 
For one possible reason, the need for verbalization of reasons for decision-
making leads participants to think more about the problems and make more rational 
decisions. When asked about their thoughts about the experiment at the end, one 
participant commented that “… speaking it out makes me think more”. The verbal 
protocol method has been shown in some studies to enhance problem-solving 
performance (Brand et al., 2003), reduce the overestimation of time taken for a task 
(Hertzum & Holmegaard, 2015), and alter the accuracy in a simple addition and a 
gamble choice task (Russo et al., 1989). Although not directly tested on the verbal 
protocols method, some other types of process-tracing methods have been proposed to 
hinder automatic processing in decision making (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). In two of 
Shafir’s (1993) problems, participants were asked to provide justifications for their 
choice by writing down the reasons upon making their decision. He found a significant 
effect of the enriched option being selected and rejected more often than the 
impoverished option in one problem but not in the other one.  The verbal protocols 
procedure used in Experiment 2 may have elicited more needs of justification than the 
written procedure. It is reasonable to speculate that people rely on more deliberative 
thinking and become more “rational” with the think-aloud task requirement. 
The other possible reason is that a portion of the online participants in the 
rejection task may have misunderstood the task frame as a selection task for at least the 
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first few questions. Note that more than half (12) of the 20 participants in the rejection 
condition of Experiment 2 understood the first question incorrectly by taking it as a 
selection task, until I reminded them that it was a rejection task. This reversal of the 
task frame was not eliminated in Experiment 1 and could have led to the results in the 
rejection task being neutralized, reflected by a flatter regression line in the rejection 
task. This speculation was also consistent with a previous finding by Shafir (1993), in 
which 59% of a group of participants reported paraphrasing the rejection question into 
the selection question, but only 14% reported paraphrasing the question in the opposite 
direction. Thus, it is reasonable to attribute the difference between the above two 
experiments to people being more easily confused by the rejection task especially when 
they are left alone to perform the tasks without proper feedback.  
Regarding the selection and rejection tasks, participants in both tasks mentioned 
the positive features equally but the rejection task led participants to think about the 
negative features more, which is in line with the compatibility account. The 
compatibility account is a reason-based approach, which proposes that when making 
decision, people seek and construct reasons to justify their choices (Shafir et al., 1993). 
The verbal protocols in this experiment required participants to speak out their 
thoughts, especially how they make the choices. These requirements may have 
promoted the participants to adopt strategies (e.g., seeking good reasons to select one 
option and bad reasons to reject one option) that fit with the compatibility account.  
To conclude, the different result patterns obtained in Experiments 1 and 2 may 
have been due to the online participants being more confused about the rejection task 
and/or the task requirements for verbalization of reasons imposed by the think-aloud 
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method. In addition, the two theoretical explanations may not be mutually exclusive, 








EXPERIMENT 3. ONLINE CHOICE TASKS EMPHASIZING TASK FRAMES 
 
 
One possible reason for the difference between Experiments 1 and 2 is that 
participants in Experiment 1 may have been confused about the task (especially the 
rejection task) without proper feedback. Experiment 3 emphasized the task frame with 
a modified version of the questionnaires. The modifications in the questionnaire 
included: (a) highlighting the word “choose” or “reject” in the instruction in bold and 
red; (b) reducing the number of questions from 30 to 15 for each participant; (c) 
including a practice question with clearly better and worse options at the beginning of 
the experiment, for which participants would get prominent feedback if they did not 
follow the task correctly; (d) adding a final question at the end to test the participant on 
whether the task was to select or to reject an option to determine whether s/he 
understood the task. The purpose of these modifications was to reduce or eliminate the 
possibility that participants in the rejection task mistake the task as a selection task, and 













Participants and Experiment Platform 
For faster and more convenient data collection, 604 participants were recruited 
from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk; www.mturk.com). MTurk is a large online 
crowdsourcing platform that allows “requesters” (e.g., social science researchers, 
business firms) to collect human-intelligence data from “workers”, who perform the 
tasks (named as Human Intelligence Task, or HIT) posted by the requesters and get 
paid (or sometimes for free). The MTurk workers for this and later MTurk experiments 
were required to be located in US and have a HIT approval rate equal to or greater than 
95%.  
Apparatus, Stimuli, Design, and Procedure 
The apparatus, stimuli, design, and procedure were similar to Experiment 1 
except the following aspects. The experiment was posted on MTurk and took about 10 
minutes on average with a payment of $0.25. At the very beginning of the experiment, 
participants were shown a unique picture taken by the researcher (see Figure 8), and 
they were told to participate in the experiment only if this was the first time they saw 
the picture. This same procedure was used in all the MTurk experiments throughout  
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this study to try to ensure that participants participated in the experiment only once and 
had not participated in other similar experiments from this study.  
To increase the quality of the responses, each participant answered 15 problems 
randomly drawn from the total 30 problems. The relative location of the enriched 
option and the impoverished option was randomized for each problem. In the 
instructions, participants in the selection condition were told, “For each problem you 
need to choose [in red] an option you like.” Those in the rejection condition were told, 
“For each problem you need to reject [in red] an option you dislike.” In addition to 
these instructions, the following practice problem was presented to all participants  
before they started the 15 problems:  
 
 
Imagine that you were invited to play one of the following two lotteries. 
Which one would you prefer (reject)? 
A a 100% chance to win $60  B a 100% chance to lose $60 
 
 
One (i.e., A) of the two options of this practice problem clearly dominates the 
other one (i.e., B), and it was assumed that participants in the selection condition would 
click on A, and those in the rejection condition would click on B if they understood the 
task correctly and were paying enough attention. When participants clicked on the 
intended option, they would see, “Please note: For all the following problems You need 
to select the option you prefer (reject) [in red]!” Otherwise, they would see a warning 
sign (see Figure 9), and the statement, “Please pay more attention! You need to select 
the option you prefer (reject) [in red]!”  Finally, after participants completed all 15 
problems, they were asked “For the problems you have completed, what were you 
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asked to do?” and provided the two options “To select an option” and “To reject an 
option”. This test question was designed to check whether participants understood the 
task frame correctly. After answering two demographic questions regarding their age 
and gender, participants were given a random code that they could input into MTurk to 
get paid. 
Results 
For the practice question, 5 out of 302 participants in the selection condition 
answered it incorrectly by selecting the gamble that had a 100% chance to lose $60; a 
higher portion, 48 out of 302 participants in the rejection condition chose to reject the 
option with a 100% chance to win $60. These participants were notified about the task 
frame again and were warned to pay more attention. Four participants in the selection 
condition and two in the rejection condition answered the last test question incorrectly, 
and they were excluded from the following analyses. The same RT cutoffs used in 
Experiment 1 were used in this experiment for excluding the outlier trials (the fixed 
reading-speed lower cutoff and the 500 ms upper cutoff excluded 16.0% and the M ± 3 
SD cutoff excluded 1.6% of the total trials).  
Choice Data 
Figure 10 shows the regression lines of the two tasks. The overall proportion 
preferring the enriched option explains a significant amount of the variance in the 
proportion preferring the enriched option in both the selection task, F(1, 28) = 1014.37, 
p < .001, R2 = .986, R2Adjusted = .972, and the rejection task, F(1, 28) = 767.76, p < .001, 
R2 = .982, R2Adjusted = .964. The coefficients of the two regression functions were 
significant, for both the selection task, Beta = 1.070, t(29) = 31.85, p < .001, and the 
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rejection task, Beta = 0.930, t(29) = 27.71, p < .001. Although the difference between 
the two coefficients was smaller, it was statistically significant, t(29) = 2.93, p = .005. 
Decision Time 
 The mean time to complete each problem was used for the timing analysis. 
There was a main effect task frame (Ms = 22.97 vs. 25.57 s for selection and rejection 
tasks, respectively), F(1, 29) = 70.82, p < .001, ηp
2 = .71, and a significant interaction 
between task frame and feature order, F(1, 29) = 7.69, p = .010, ηp
2 = .21. For positive-
negative feature order, the mean RT was 23.13 for the selection task and 25.13 for the 
rejection task; for negative-positive feature order, the mean RT was 22.81 for both the 
selection and 26.01 for the rejection task. The main effect of feature order was not 
significant, F(1, 29) = 1.75, p = .197 , ηp












The purpose of this experiment was to test whether the difference between 
Experiments 1 and 3A was due to the participant population or to the changes in the 
survey design. The same experiment as in Experiment 3A was conducted on a total of 
601 participants recruited through the Sona system. Participants in this experiment had 
not participated in other similar experiments and were granted 1 research credit 
towards the course requirements.  
Results 
The same data analysis procedure for Experiment 3A was used. For the practice 
question, 4 out of 304 participants in the selection condition answered it incorrectly by 
selecting the gamble that had a 100% chance to lose $60; 31 out of 299 participants in 
the rejection condition chose to reject the option with a 100% chance to win $60. These 
participants were notified about the task frame again and were warned to pay more 
attention. Twelve participants in the seleciton condition and seven in the rejection 
condition were excluded from subsequent analyses because they gave an incorrect 
answer to the last test question. The fixed cutoffs excluded 10.8% and the M ± 3 SD 
cutoff excluded 1.9% of the total trials.  
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Choice Data  
Figure 11 shows the regression lines of the two tasks. The overall proportion 
preferring the enriched option explains a significant amount of the variance in the 
proportion preferring the enriched option in both the selection task, F(1, 28) = 1054.46, 
p < .001, R2 = .987, R2Adjusted = .973, and the rejection task, F(1, 28) = 515.28, p < .001, 
R2 = .974, R2Adjusted = .947. The coefficients of the two regression functions were 
significant, for both the selection task, Beta = 1.177, t(29) = 32.47, p < .001, and the 
rejection task, Beta = 0.823, t(29) = 22.70, p < .001. More importantly, the difference 
between the two coefficients was also significant, t(29) = 6.91, p < .001. 
Decision Time 
The mean time to complete each problem was used for the timing analysis. 
None of the terms was significant: For the main effects of task frame and feature order, 




The redesigned questionnaire used in Experiment 3 yielded a smaller task frame 
effect than that in Experiment 1, yet the effect was still significant and conformed to 
the accentuation account. Experiment 3 included clear task instructions emphasizing 
the task frames, a practice question at beginning with feedback, and a test question at 
the end for screening confused participants. These manipulations should have reduced, 
if not eliminated, the possible confusion participants had on the task frame. In addition, 
Experiment 3B was conducted on the same population and the same online platform 
(Sona) as Experiment 1.  
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Results in both Experiments 3A and 3B showed a task framing effect 
qualitatively similar to the effect found in Experiment 1, in which participants were 
more discriminating under the selection task frame than under the rejection one, again 
supporting the accentuation account. Note that the task framing effect (i.e., the 
difference between tasks) did become smaller in Experiment 3 than that in Experiment 
1, indicating that task confusion likely was a contributor in the effect found in 
Experiment 1, though it cannot be the whole story. These results indicate that the null 
task framing effect in Experiment 2 was due to both reasons discussed earlier: 









EXPERIMENT 4. ONLINE ATTRACTIVENESS JUDGMENT TASK 
 
 
Wedell (1997) used the overall proportion of the enriched option being 
preferred as the index for the relative attractiveness of the enriched option, as did the 
previous experiments in the current study. The purpose of Experiment 4 was to directly 
obtain the attractiveness ratings of the options by requiring participants to rate the 
likelihood that they would select (or reject) an option when only one option was 
presented. Another purpose was to test whether the attractiveness judgment was 
influenced by the framing of the question.  
Method 
Participants 
A total of 300 participants were recruited through MTurk. The same screening 
requirements for MTurk workers in Experiment 3 were used. The experiment took 
about 9.5 minutes on average and the payment was $0.50. The same picture was used 
to require that the participants had not participated in a similar study before.  
Apparatus, Stimuli, Design, and Procedure 
In the instruction, participants were told, “You will be presented with a number 
of problems, for each of which you need to rate the likelihood that you will choose 
(reject) [in red] a given option for that problem.” The ratings were done for each of the 
two options in each problem, and each rating question only included one option, so 
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there were in total 60 distinct rating questions. Each participant performed on 30 
questions that were randomly selected from the total 60 questions. Participants were 
told to take as much time as they need to complete all 30 questions, and the time to 
complete each question was not recorded. In the positive condition, the question was 
presented along with one option, and participants were asked, “How likely will you 
choose [this option]?” on a 10-point scale (1 = very unlikely; 10 = very likely). In the 
negative condition, participants were asked, “How likely will you choose [this 
option]?” Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions. Similar to 
Experiment 3, a practice question was presented to the participants at the beginning of 
the experiment: 
 
Imagine that you were to play a lottery. One lottery has a 100% chance 
to win $60. 
How likely will you choose (reject) to play this lottery? 
 
 
It was expected that participants in the positive condition would give a rating 
among 6 to 10 for the likelihood of choosing this lottery and participants in the 
negative condition would give a rating among 1 to 5 for the likelihood of rejecting this 
lottery. When they gave a rating within the expected range for this practice question, 
participants saw a the message, “Please note: For all the following questions You need 
to rate the likelihood that you will choose [in red] the option!”; otherwise, they saw the 
warning sign shown in Figure 5 along with the statement, “Please pay more attention! 
You need to rate the likelihood that you will choose (reject) [in red] the option!” Each 
participant completed 30 questions randomly selected from all 60 questions. 
50 
Results 
One participant whose age was less than 18 years was excluded from the 
subsequent analyses.  
For the practice question (One lottery has a 100% chance to win $60), which 
should have an obvious rating of attractiveness (high likelihood to choose to play this 
lottery or low likelihood to reject to play this lottery). In the positive rating task, 98.1% 
of the participants rated the likelihood to choose to play this lottery higher than or 
equal to 6, 88.8% of whom rated it as 10; in the negative rating task, only 61.4% of the 
participants rated the likelihood to reject to play this lottery lower than or equal to 5, 
88.7% of whom rated it as 1; more importantly, 33.1% of the participants rated it as 10, 
who clearly misunderstood the task (see Table 1). As to the final test question asking 
what the task was, only three participants answered incorrectly and they were further 
excluded from subsequent analyses.  
 The ratings in the negative condition were transformed by subtracting them 
from 11 (= 11 − rating) to get the attractiveness rating used in the following analysis. 
An ANOVA was used to test (see Carifio & Perla, 2007) the effects of task frame 
(positive vs. negative), option type (enriched vs. impoverished), and feature order 
(positive-negative vs. negative-positive) on the attractiveness ratings. The results 
showed only a significant effect of enriched vs. impoverished option, and the enriched 
options were rated less attractive than the impoverished options (Ms = 5.19 vs. 6.33). 
No other effects were significant, Fs < 1.30. 
The more important purpose of this experiment was to obtain the relative 
attractiveness rating of the enriched option through direct rating. The mean rating for 
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each option in each problem was computed across all valid participants in both the 
positive and negative tasks given that the task frame term was not involved in any 
significant effect in the above ANOVA analysis. The relative attractiveness was  
calculated by the following formula: 
 
 
 0.5 	 	 	
	 	
 ,  
 
 
where Attr stands for the relative attractiveness score, R stands for the mean rating. 
Discussion 
For the practice question, less than 10% of the participants in the positive rating 
task were confused by or not paying attention to the task, yet nearly 40% of the 
participants in the negative rating task seemed to fall in one or the other of these 
categories. This discrepancy indicates that it is easier for people in the positive rating to 
understand the task than people in the negative rating task, in line with the findings in 
previous experiments that participants were more easily confused in the rejection task 
than in the selection task. In addition, the results demonstrate the necessity of including 
such practice questions in this type of study to help participants understand the task and 
prevent misunderstanding, especially when the study is conducted online. The high 
accuracy rates in the final test question for both positive and negative rating tasks 
indicate that the warning feedback following the practice question was effective in 
reminding people of the actual task requirement. 
The task framing in this experiment did not have an influence on participants’ 
judgments. This result was not consistent with the compatibility account, which would 
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predict the enriched option to be rated as more attractive in the positive rating task than 
in the negative rating task because people put more weights on the positive features in 
the positive task and on the negative features in the negative task. As to predictions 
from the accentuation account, on the one hand, it emphasizes accentuation of the 
difference between options in the selection task. In the current judgment task, each 
option was presented separately from the other one in the same problem, and thus no 
accentuation of difference existed in the current setting.  
On the other hand, the accentuation account proposes that the difference 
between the two tasks is because different levels of commitment are involved in the 
tasks. Ganzach (1995) compared the judgment and choice tasks, and claimed that 
judgment task involves less commitment than choice task because “people have to live 
with the outcome of their choices but not with the output of their judgments” (p. 114). 
It is possible that the present found no difference in the positive and negative rating 
tasks was due to there being not much commitment involved in either tasks. Thus, the 
current results were at least not against the accentuation account. 
The relative attractiveness index was then used to replace the overall proportion 
of preferring the enriched option in the previous and later experiments, and similar 
result patterns were obtained. The new regression plots are presented below the 









EXPERIMENT 5. IN-LAB CHOICE TASK WITH EYE-TRACKING 
 
 
The purpose of this experiment was to examine the information-processing 
pattern through tracking eye movements while participants work on the problems under 
the selection and rejection task frames. The compatibility account predicts that 
participants will focus on the features that are more compatible with the task (i.e., focus 
on positive features or the best values when selecting and on the negative features or 
the worst values when rejecting), regardless of the overall relative attractiveness 
difference between the enriched and impoverished options. In contrast, the 
accentuation account predicts that participants will focus on the differences between 
alternatives in selection tasks but not so much in rejection tasks. Thus, under this 
assumption, participants will compare between the alternatives more in the selection 
task, and there will be more eye-movement transitions between the alternatives on the 
same features.  
Given that the degree of accentuation is proposed to be based on the different 
levels of commitment in the two tasks, the accentuation account also predicts that 
people in the selection task will “pay more attention or be more willing to repeatedly 
sample reasons” than in the rejection task due to greater need for justification in the 
selection task.  
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This experiment employed number of fixations and total time spent as measures 
of amount of effort and information search, mean fixation duration as a measure of 
processing depth, and relative ratio of different types of fixation transitions 
(alternative-based vs. attribute-based) as a measure of information search pattern. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 49 participants (17 female, age 19.5 ± 1.2) from the same subject 
pool as those in Experiments 1 and 2 were recruited from SONA. These participants 
had not participated in previous experiments.  
Apparatus and Stimuli 
A Tobii X-60 (Tobii Technology AB, Danderyd, Sweden) eye tracker and the 
iMotions Attention Tool 5.3 software (iMotions Inc., Cambridge, MA) were used to 
record the eye movements of the participants during the experiments. The stimuli were 
presented on a 23ʺ monitor that was connected with the eye tracker. The same 
questionnaire used in Experiment 3 was used in this experiment, with some minor 
wording modifications to fit each feature in one single line when presented on the 
computer screen connected to the eye tracker. 
Design and Procedure 
Half of the participants performed the selection task, and the other half 
performed the rejection task. The order of the 30 problems was randomly assigned for 
each participant. In each problem, participants will be shown the problem statement (on 
top) and two options (below the problem statement, side by side) simultaneously on the 
screen. The position (left vs. right) of the enriched option relative to the impoverished 
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option, and the order of the features within each option were treated as control 
variables by being counterbalanced between-subjects within each task conditions. 
Thus, for example, among the 24 participants who performed the selection task, 6 
participants saw the enriched option to the left (or right) of the impoverished option 
and the positive features above (or below) the negative features within each option. 
Each attribute was defined as an area of interest (AOI). The AOIs were of the same 
size, large enough to cover the longest feature of all problems, and were not 
overlapped. Fixations on other areas were not considered for further analysis. 
Results 
One participant was excluded from the subsequent analyses due to the failure to 
follow the instruction to look at the computer screen during the experiment.  
Choice Data 
The overall proportion preferring the enriched option explains a significant 
amount of the variance in the proportion preferring the enriched option in both the 
selection task (see Figure 12), F(1, 28) = 490.17, p < .001, R2 = .946, R2Adjusted = .944, 
and the rejection task, F(1, 28) = 216.48, p < .001, R2 = .885, R2Adjusted = .881. The 
coefficients of the two regression functions were significant, for both the selection task, 
Beta = 1.202, t(29) = 22.14, p < .001, and the rejection task, Beta = .798, t(29) = 14.71, 
p < .001. More importantly, the difference between the two coefficients was 
significant, t(29) = 5.25, p < .001.  
Eye-Movement Data 
The problem statement and each of the features were defined as AOIs (areas of 
interest), and the following data for each AOI in each problem page were obtained by 
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averaging across participants in each task condition: number of fixations (for fixaitons 
equal to or longer than 100 ms), fixation duration (ms; the duration of each fixation), 
time spent (ms; the sum of the durations of all fixations within the AOI), time spent 
percent (%; the percent of the time spent out of the total time spent on the page).  
The features within each option were then grouped into positive vs. negative 
features by collapsing the positive features (2 or 3 out of 5 total features, or 1 out of 2 
features) and the negative features (3 or 2 out of 5 totaol features, or 1 out of 2 
features) for the following analyses. Each problem was treated as an experimental unit 
in repeated-measure ANOVAs for time spent, time spent percent, number of fixaitons, 
and fixation duration, with feature valence (positive vs. negative), option (enriched vs. 
impoverished), and task (selection vs. rejection) as within-subject variables.  
 Number of fixations. The only significant effect was the main effect of the 
option type, F(1, 29) = 4.34, p = .046, ηp
2 = .13. There were more fixations on the 
enriched option (M = 6.99) than on the impoverished option (M = 6.58). No other 
effects were significant, ps ≥ .195. The means were 6.84 for the selection task and 6.73 
for the rejection task. Although the data on the problem instructions were not included 
in the current analysis, for the purpose of completeness, the number of fixations on the 
problem instructions did not differ across the two tasks (Ms = 21.43 vs. 21.71), t(29) = 
0.43, p = .672. 
Average fixation duration. There was a significant main effect of option type, 
F(1, 29) = 8.53, p = .007, ηp
2 = .23, and an interaction between option type and task, 
F(1, 29) = 12.67, p = .001, ηp
2 = .30. The enriched option had longer average fixation 
durations (M = 216 ms) than the impoverished option did (M = 212 ms). These 
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differences were mainly due to the interaction that the enriched option had longer 
fixation durations in the rejection task (Ms = 219 vs. 212 ms), but not in the selection 
task (Ms = 212 vs. 211 ms). The selection task tended to have shorter average fixation 
durations (M = 212 ms) compared to the rejection task (M = 215), F(1, 29) = 3.80, p 
= .061, ηp
2 = .12. No other effects were significant, Fs < 1.02. Again, no difference in 
the average fixation durations on the problem instructions, (Ms = 204 vs. 207 ms), t(29) 
= .65, p = .523. Note that although the difference in average fixation duration in the 
current experiment was relatively small, there were previous studies that found 
significant differences of similar size. For example, Rubaltelli et al. (2012) found a 9-
ms difference between a pricing task and an attractiveness rating task (M = 203 vs. 194 
ms) and concluded “deeper and more deliberative processing” in the former task. 
Time spent. This is a measure of how much participants spent on the features 
in the options. The only significant effect was the main effect of the option type (Ms = 
1552 and 1415 ms for enriched and impoverished options, respectively), F(1, 29) = 
6.51 p = .016, ηp
2 = .18. No other effects were significant, ps ≥ .168. The mean time 
spent was 1458 in the selection condition and 1480 in the rejection condition. There 
was no difference in time spent on the problem instruction in the two tasks (Ms = 4547 
vs. 4607 ms), t(29) = .41, p = .688. 
Percent of time spent. This is a measure of the ratio of the time spent on the 
features to the time spent on the whole page. There was a significant main effect of 
task (Ms = 6.34% vs. 6.17% for selection and rejection tasks, respectively), F(1, 29) = 
6.00, p = .021, ηp
2 = .17. No other effects were significant, ps ≥ .101. There was no  
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difference for the problem instructions (Ms = 17.66% vs. 18.42%), t (29) = 1.70, p 
= .100. 
Fixation transitions. An alternative-based transition was defined if a fixation 
transition was made within the same alternative, and an attribute-based transition was 
defined if the transition was made from one alternative to the other on the same 
attribute. A repeated-measure ANOVA was conducted on the number of fixation 
transitions with transition type (alternative-based vs. attribute-based) as a within-
subject variable and task frame (selection vs. rejection) as a between-subject variable. 
There was only a main effect of transition type (Ms = 10.35 vs. 4.26 for alternative- 
and attribute-based transitions, respectively), F(1, 1436) = 1409.39, p < .001, ηp
2 = .50. 
No other effects were significant, Fs < 1. A similar result pattern was obtained when 
computing the fixation transitions in the form of Payne index (Payne, 1976), which 
equals to the ratio of the difference between the numbers of the alternative- and 
attribute-based transitions and the sum of the two numbers. 
Since there was no effect of the feature valence, the same analyses were 
conducted by grouping all the features in each option altogether rather than grouping 
them into the positive and negative two groups. Each problem was again treated as an 
experimental unit in repeated-measure ANOVAs for time spent, time spent percent, 
number of fixaitons, and fixation duration, with option (enriched vs. impoverished), 
and task (selection vs. rejection) as within-subject variables.  
 Number of fixations. The only significant effect was the main effect of the 
option type, F(1, 29) = 7.03, p = .013, ηp
2 = .20. There were more fixations on the 
enriched option (M = 29.44) than on the impoverished option (M = 27.01). No other 
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effects were significant: For the main effect of task frame (Ms = 28.78 vs. 27.67), F(1, 
29) = 2.71, p = .110, ηp
2 = .09, and for the 2-way interaction, F(1, 29) = 3.61, p = .068, 
ηp
2 = .11. In the selection task, Ms = 29.70 vs. 27.87 for the enriched vs. impoverished 
options, respectively; in the rejection task, Ms =29.19 vs. 26.16 for the enriched vs. 
impoverished options, respectively. 
Average fixation duration. There were significant main effects of task, F(1, 
29) = 12.83, p = .001, ηp
2 = .31, and option type, F(1, 29) = 11.67, p = .002, ηp
2 = .29, 
and an interaction between option type and task, F(1, 29) = 9.30, p = .005, ηp
2 = .24. 
The selection task had shorter average fixation duration (M = 211 ms) than the 
rejection task (M = 217 ms). The enriched option had longer average fixation durations 
(M = 216 ms) than the impoverished option did (M = 211 ms). These differences were 
mainly due to the interaction that the enriched option had longer fixation durations in 
the rejection task (Ms = 221 vs. 213 ms), but not in the selection task (Ms = 212 vs. 210 
ms).  
Time spent. This is a measure of how much participants spent on the features 
in the options. There was a significant main effect of the option type (Ms = 6417 and 
5789 ms for enriched and impoverished options, respectively), F(1, 29) = 10.53, p 
= .003, ηp
2 = .27, and a significant interaction between option type and task, F(1, 29) = 
5.44, p = .027, ηp
2 = .16. The difference between the two options was larger in the 
rejection task (Ms = 6481 vs. 5698 ms for enriched and impoverished options, 
respectively) than in the selection task (Ms = 6353 vs. 5878 ms). The main effect of 
task was not significant, F(1, 29) = .03, p = .871, ηp
2 = .00. The time spent was 6115 
ms in the selection condition and 6089 ms in the rejection condition.  
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Percent of time spent. There was a significant main effect of option type (Ms = 
25.98% vs. 23.79%), F(1, 29) = 8.23, p = .007, ηp
2 = .22. The main effect of task was 
approaching the .05 significance level (Ms = 25.10% vs. 24.67% for selection and 
rejection tasks, respectively), F(1, 29) = 3.53, p = .071, ηp
2 = .11. The interaction 
between the two factors was not significant, F(1, 29) = 2.84, p = .103, ηp
2 = .09. 
Discussion 
The choice data showed that participants in the selection condition were more 
discriminating than those in the rejection condition, again supporting the accentuation 
account. This result pattern was consistent with the previous experiments, except 
Experiment 2 (verbal protocols). Note that participants in this experiment were well 
aware of the tasks because of the first practice question and reminders from the 
experimenter. This different pattern from Experiment 2 provides evidence that the 
overlapping of the two regression lines in Experiment 2 was due to the need of 
justification for the choice. 
The eye-movement data did not show as rich patterns regarding the task frame 
as expected, however, there were some interesting results worth mentioning. The 
average fixation duration, which is a measure for cognitive effort, was longer in the 
rejection than in the selection task. Participants in the rejection task spent more effort 
on the options than those in the selection task. In addition, although time spent did not 
show a difference between the two tasks, the analysis on time spent percent showed a 
tendency for a higher percent in the selection than in the rejection task. These results 
indicate that although participants spent roughly the same amount of the time on the 
options, those in the rejection task spent more time on other information other than the 
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options. These differences imply the same speculation as in previous question that the 








EXPERIMENT 6. ONLINE CHOICE TASK WITH TIME PRESSURE 
 
 
The accentuation account proposes that the difference between the alternatives 
is accentuated more in the selection task than in the rejection task. Is this accentuation 
an automatic process or a deliberative process? Is the accentuation process fast enough 
not to be influenced by time pressure? Under time pressure, people tend to rely more 
on automatic processes and reduce analytic processes (e.g., Finucane et al., 2000). If 
the accentuation of alternative difference is deliberative, then the task framing effect 
should be reduced under time pressure; if the accentuation is automatic and fast, then 
the task framing effect should remain the same under time pressure. The purpose of 
this experiment was to investigate how time pressure affects the role of task frame, and 
thus understand the nature of the accentuation process. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 606 participants were recruited from MTurk using the same 
procedure as in Experiment 3.  
Apparatus, Stimuli, Design, and Procedure 
The same questionnaire used in Experiment 3 was used, but with time 
constraints. The mean and standard deviation for the time to submit each problem in 
each of the selection and rejection tasks in Experiment 3 were obtained and used to 
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compute the time limit for each problem. The time allowed for answering each problem 
was one standard deviation below the mean, which has been commonly used in 
previous studies (e.g., Huber & Kunz, 2007). For each problem, the time remaining 
was indicated by a countdown timer at the bottom of the screen. 
Results 
For the practice question, 5 out of 306 participants in the selection condition 
answered it incorrectly by selecting the gamble that had a 100% chance to lose $60; 32 
out of 300 participants in the rejection condition chose to reject the option with a 100% 
chance to win $60. These participants were notified about the task frame again and 
were warned to pay more attention. Two participants in the selection condition and 
seven in the rejection condition answered the last test question incorrectly, and they 
were excluded from the following analyses. Only the fixed reading time lower cutoff 
was used to exclude outlier trials. The 500 ms upper cutoff and the M ± 3 SD cutoff 
were not used because the predetermined time limit used for each problem served as an 
upper cutoff. For two problems (#14 and 27), the computed time limits were shorter 
than the least reading times in the selection condition, and these two problems were 
eliminated from subsequent analyses. The reading time cutoff excluded 33% of the 
total trials for the rest 28 problems. 
Figure 13 shows the regression lines of the two tasks. The overall proportion 
preferring the enriched option explains a significant amount of the variance in the 
proportion preferring the enriched option in both the selection task, F(1, 28) = 470.46, 
p < .001, R2 = .948, R2Adjusted = .946, and the rejection task, F(1, 28) = 288.81, p < .001, 
R2 = .917, R2Adjusted = .914. The coefficients of the two regression functions were 
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significant, for both the selection task, Beta = 1.122, t(29) = 21.69, p < .001, and the 
rejection task, Beta = 0.878, t(29) = 17.00, p < .001. The difference between the two 
coefficients was significant, t(29) = 3.33, p = .002, and this difference did not differ 
from the corresponding difference in Experiment 3A, t (108) = 1.22, p = .226. 
Decision Time 
The mean time to complete each problem was used for the timing analysis. 
There was a main effect of task frame (Ms = 12.08 vs. 12.71 s for selection and 
rejection tasks, respectively), F(1, 27) = 9.82, p = .004, ηp
2 = .27, and a main effect of 
feature order (Ms = 12.36 vs. 12.42 s for positive-negative and negative-positive 
orders, respectively), F(1, 27) = 4.76, p = .038, ηp
2 = .15. The interaction between task 
frame and feature order was not significant, F(1, 27) = 3.32, p = .080, ηp
2 = .11.  
Discussion 
The average decision time was 12.4 s, which was approximately half of the 
average time in the previous three online experiments (26.5 s in Experiment 1 with 
Sona participants, 24.3 s in Experiment 3A with MTurk participants, and 26.9 s in 
Experiment 3B with Sona participants). One of the MTurk workers sent an email to me 
stating that the task was “stressful but interesting”. Although this experiment did not 
directly measure participants’ perception of the time pressure, the time pressure 
manipulation seems to be successful. 
Under time pressure, the same task framing effect explained by the accentuation 
account was found, of similar size as in previous experiments. That the time pressure 
did not influence the task framing effect indicates that the accentuation process seems 
to be relatively automatic. This would also explain why the verbal protocols method in 
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Experiment 2 eliminated the task framing effect: the requirement for verbalization of 
reasons promoted more deliberative thinking, which may have overridden the 
automatic processes of accentuating the difference between alternatives more in the 








EXPERIMENT 7. ONLINE CHOICE TASK “ANTI” TIME PRESSURE 
 
 
Although it is convenient and efficient in data collection, one problem with 
collecting data on MTurk is that the workers may work through the problems as fast as 
they can by default so that they can move on to the next HIT posted by other people. 
This default status may have imposed implicit time pressure on the workers, which 
may be a problem for many other online platforms too. In Experiments 3A and 6, By 
excluding the answers that were given in a very short time (e.g., the time needed to 
read only the two options in each problem at the fast average reading speed), I have 
tried to solve this issue implicit time pressure in data analyses. The purpose of the 
current experiment was to provide a solution while participants performed the tasks, by 
forcing a “waiting time” for each problem. Participants had to wait a certain amount of 
time before they could click on the “next” button to submit their answers.   
Method 
Participants 
A total of 600 participants were recruited from MTurk using the same 
procedure as in Experiment 3.  
Apparatus, Stimuli, Design, and Procedure 
The same questionnaire used in Experiment 3 was used, but with different time 
constraints. Unlike in Experiment 6, participants were encouraged to take as much time 
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as they need, and they had to wait a certain amount of time (i.e., the mean for the time 
to submit each problem in each task in Experiment 3) before they could respond to 
each problem. Each problem was presented for the designated wait time without a 
“next” button, on which only by clicking were participants able to proceed. After this 
predetermined time window, the “next” button showed up at the right bottom of the 
page, and then participants could respond immediately or wait longer to respond.  
Results 
For the practice question, 1 out of 300 participants in the selection condition 
answered it incorrectly by selecting the gamble that had a 100% chance to lose $60; 41 
out of 300 participants in the rejection condition chose to reject the option with a 100% 
chance to win $60. These participants were notified about the task frame again and 
were warned to pay more attention. Three participants in the selection condition and 
three in the rejection condition answered the last test question incorrectly, and they 
were excluded from the following analyses. The same cutoffs for response time as 
those in Experiment 3 were used. The fixed cutoff and the M + 3 SD cutoff excluded 
0.04% trials in total. 
Figure 14 shows the regression lines of the two tasks. The overall proportion 
preferring the enriched option explains a significant amount of the variance in the 
proportion preferring the enriched option in both the selection task, F(1, 28) = 1315.12, 
p < .001, R2 = .979, R2Adjusted = .978, and the rejection task, F(1, 2) = 860.76, p < .001, 
R2 = .968, R2Adjusted = .967. The coefficients of the two regression functions were 
significant, for both the selection task, Beta = 1.106, t(29) = 36.27, p < .001, and the 
rejection task, Beta = 0.894, t(29) = 29.34, p < .001. The difference between the two 
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coefficients was significant, t(29) = 4.91, p < .001, and this difference did not differ 
from the corresponding difference in Experiment 3A, t(112) = 1.13, p = 0.263, or 
Experiment 6, t(108) = 0.38, p = .702. 
Decision Time 
The mean time to complete each problem was used for the timing analysis. 
There was a main effect of task frame (Ms =29.02 vs. 32.63 s for selection and 
rejection tasks, respectively), F(1, 29) = 118.84, p < .001, ηp
2 = .80, and a main effect 
of feature order (Ms = 30.42 vs. 31.23 s for positive-negative and negative-positive 
orders, respectively), F(1, 29) = 28.66, p < .001, ηp
2 = .50. The interaction between task 
frame and feature order was not significant, F(1, 29) = 0.01, p = .945, ηp
2 = .00.  
Discussion 
 The mean decision time in this experiment (30.8 s) was longer than the mean in 
Experiment 3A (24.3 s) which was also conducted on the MTurk workers but with no 
specific time constraints. This difference is understandable because the forced waiting 
time in the present experiment was defined by the mean decision time in Experiment 
3A in each problem. More interestingly, the regression lines for the choice data showed 
a very similar pattern in both experiments, which did not differ from the time pressure 
condition in Experiment 6 with a mean decision time of 12.4 s. Thus, the similar 
patterns in task framing effect revealed in Experiments 3A and 6 were not due to the 
implicit time pressure the MTurk workers may have in Experiment 3A. The results 
from this experiment validate the finding in Experiment 6 that the accentuation process 
is relatively automatic and is not affected by time pressure. 
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This finding should be welcomed by researchers who collect data on MTurk, 
yet a caution should be placed for collecting data on MTurk and other online platforms. 
Note that in Experiment 3A the reading-speed cutoff excluded approximately 16% of 
the total data, which indicates that at some participants were “rushing through” on 
some problems. With justifiable cutoff methods of excluding outliers, the data obtained 
with no time constraints could be taken as being as valid as when the waiting time was 
imposed on the participants. However, the loss of data due to the exclusion of outliers 












The seven experiments, conducted in laboratory and online, used a variety of 
methods to examine how different task frames change the decision maker’s preference. 
The predictions from the compatibility account and the accentuation account were 
tested. The compatibility account (Shafir, 1993) predicts the enriched option to be 
preferred more often under the selection task frame than under the rejection task frame, 
due to the reason that the more positive (negative) features in the enriched option are 
more compatible with and are thus weighted more the selection (rejection) task.  The 
accentuation account (Wedell, 1997) predicts the more attractive option to be preferred 
more and the less attractive option to be preferred less in the selection task than in the 
rejection task, due to the rationale that people are more discriminating in the selection 
task with a higher level of commitment involved than in the rejection task. The results 
in all but one experiment fit with the prediction from the accentuation account.  
Experiment 1 was conducted online on introductory psychology class students, 
with a plain statement for the task (either a selection or a rejection one), and a large 
difference between the two task frames (the task framing effect) was found as predicted 
by the accentuation account. In Experiment 2, participants were recruited from the 
same subject pool but were required to verbalize their thoughts while performing the 
same tasks in a laboratory. No difference between the two task frames in the choice 
71 
data was found in this experiment, possibly due to the need for verbalization of reasons 
in Experiment 2 or the confusion about the rejection task in Experiment 1. With a 
modified version of the questionnaire conducted on both MTurk workers (Experiment 
3A) and introductory psychology students (Experiment 3B), Experiment 3 emphasized 
the tasks in several different ways to reduce the possible confusion regarding the task, 
and a similar pattern as in Experiment 1 was evident though with a smaller effect size. 
Thus, it was established that task confusion cannot explain the task framing effect 
alone.  
Experiment 4 used a judgment task, in which participants were required to rate 
the likelihood of selecting or rejecting an option. It was again found that more 
participants in the negative task did not understand the task correctly before any 
feedback was provided. The ratings from this experiment were used as direct 
attractiveness measures and a similar task framing effect was found with these 
measures. The finding of task framing effect was supported by the data from an eye-
tracking experiment (Experiment 5), in which participants were invited to the lab 
performing the tasks without being required to verbalize their thoughts. In the last two 
experiments, whether the task framing effect was influenced by time pressure was 
tested. Experiment 6 imposed time limits on participants and required them to respond 
within a short time, whereas Experiment 7 forced participants to wait a certain amount 
of time before they could respond. Both experiments found a task framing effect that 
did not differ from that in Experiment 3A, which indicates that this task framing effect 
was relatively automatic and that it did not extra take time for people being more 
discriminating in the selection task than in the rejection task.  
72 
Positive Versus Negative Tasks 
In the current choice tasks of Experiments 3A, 3B, 6, and 7, participants were 
first shown a practice question after the instructions. There was an obviously desirable 
option (i.e., a 100% chance to win $60) and an undesirable one (i.e., a 100% chance to 
lose $60) in the practice question. The logic was that if participants were paying 
attention and understood the task accurately, they would select the desirable option or 
rejection the undesirable one. A consistent finding was that more participants in the 
rejection task (M = 12.7% across experiments) answered the practice question 
incorrectly than those in the selection task (M = 1.2%). In Experiment 2 with the verbal 
protocols, 12 of the 20 participants in the rejection task took the task as a selection one 
without the experimenter’s reminder, but none in the selection task mistook the task. 
Similarly in the judgment task of Experiment 4, participants were to rate their 
likelihood of choosing or rejecting a highly desirable lottery with a 100% chance to 
win $60. Consistent with the pattern in the choice tasks, more participants in the 
negative rating task (38.7%) showed task confusion or inattention than those in the 
positive rating task (1.9%).  
There are several possible reasons for the difference between the two task 
frames. It is possible that some participants were not paying attention to what they 
were doing when performing a task online. These participants may have taken it for 
granted that the task was a positive one of selection or rating the likelihood of selection, 
because most online experiments they have encountered should involve a positive task. 
The same is true for most daily life problems, a simple example of which is that people 
typically purchase more than they return. In the worst case, some participants may 
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click on an option randomly because the questions were supposed to reflect personal 
preferences. In the latter, the number of “random” participants should not differ under 
the two task frames because the problem was not elicited by the task per se, and thus 
the number should be very small because only less than 2% of the participants in the 
positive tasks did so. 
In a study by Chen, Gates, Li, and Proctor (2015), participants were required to 
make a hypothetic decision on whether to install a mobile app. Along with other 
information such as user ratings, a risk or safety score in the form of filled circles was 
presented on for each app. Chen et al. found that this risk or safety score influenced 
participants’ decision making that the higher (lower) the safety (risk) score, the more 
often the app was selected. Moreover, the safety score had a larger effect (i.e., people 
were more discriminating) than the risk score, similar to the comparison between the 
selection and rejection tasks in the current study. Chen et al. included a final test 
question to examine participants’ understanding of the risk or safety symbols, and 
found that more people in the risk condition answered the test question incorrectly than 
in the safety condition. A follow-up analysis was conducted on the participants who 
identified the symbols correctly, and the difference between the safety and risk frames 
(i.e., the advantage for presenting a safety score) tended to be smaller but still 
significant. Although framing in Chen et al.’s study was not in terms of the task but the 
information, the result pattern similar to the current study indicates that a negative way 
of presenting the information in terms of risk could have led to more confusion than a 
positive way of presenting the information in terms of safety.  
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Another possible reason is that the greater task confusion in the negative task 
was due to its requiring more effort to understand than the positive task. With limited 
time and effort people may attribute to a task, the more difficult the task the more 
likely errors will occur. Moreover, the current data in Experiments (1, 3A, 3B, 6, and 7) 
showed that participants tended to spent more time under the rejection task frame than 
under the selection frame. In the eye-tracking experiment (Experiment 5), although the 
total time to complete each problem did not differ under the two task frames, the 
average fixation duration (a measure of cognitive effort) was longer in the rejection 
task than in the selection task. These data indicate that the rejection task may be more 
effortful and occupy more cognitive resources.  
Improvement of the Accentuation Account 
Accentuation of Difference? 
The accentuation account proposes that the reason why participants are more 
discriminating in the selection task than in the rejection task is because the difference 
between attributes being accentuated more in the selection task, which involves a 
higher level commitment. As stated by Wedell (1997), “The accentuation hypothesis 
simply argues that greater commitment or need for justification in choice leads to 
greater weighting of attribute differences. In other words, people are more 
discriminating when choosing than when rejecting” (p. 874).   
The current study showed the result pattern that is predicted by the accentuation 
account in the sense that participants were more discriminating in the selection task 
than in the rejection task. However, regarding the accentuation process, I argue that 
people have to process the features before knowing the difference, so that there is a 
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leap to assume that the task frame actually influences how people weight the difference 
rather than to assume what is influenced is a process on the features per se. Thus, I 
propose that a more direct explanation is that people evaluate the positive features 
being more positive and/or the negative ones being more negative in the selection task, 
which yield to a greater discrimination in the selection than in the rejection task. This 
new way of looking at the accentuation process also makes it possible to extend the 
accentuation account to explain results from judgment tasks on each option 
individually, in which the difference between the options is not available within one 
problem. 
Difference in Discrimination 
Regarding the reason why people are more discriminating under the selection 
task frame than under the rejection task frame, I propose that available cognitive 
resource is a possible critical factor. The current experiments did not test directly the 
levels of commitment involved in the two tasks, neither did the previous studies by 
Ganzach (1995) or Wedell (1997). The assumption that the selection task involves 
more commitment than the rejection task was from the speculation that people need to 
live with the option they make in the selection task but not the one in the rejection task 
(Ganzach, 1995). Meloy and Russo (2004) tested the commitment level in both a 
selection and rejection tasks, using a subjective certainty rating as a measure, and 
found that the commitment level was not higher in the selection task than in the 
rejection task. Based on the current data, participants were more confused about the 
rejection task (Experiments 2, 3, 6, and 7), spent more time in the rejection task than in  
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the selection task (Experiments 1, 3, 6, and 7), or had a longer average fixation 
duration in the rejection task than in the selection task (Experiment 5).  
Consequently, it is reasonable to think that people in the rejection task have to 
spend part of their cognitive resource in understanding the task per se and thus less 
resource is available for the decisions to make. In the rejection task, if people have to 
put some effort into understanding the task itself, then they may not have as many 
resources to devote to the choice as people in the selection task. As a result, people in 
the rejection task are not as discriminating as those in the selection task. Thus, it is 
possible that people are more discriminating in the selection task because more 
available cognitive resources are available for discriminating between the options than 
in the rejection task, though the influence of different levels of commitment cannot be 
excluded without further empirical evidence. 
Modified Accentuation Account 
Based on the above evaluation, I propose a modified version of the accentuation 
account according to the above analyses. The selection versus rejection task frame has 
an influence on people’s preferences, based on two assumptions: 1) People under the 
rejection task frame need to spend part of their cognitive resources to understanding the 
task, and thus have less cognitive resource available to discriminate the alternatives. 2) 
Compared to those under the rejection task frame, people under the selection task are 
more discriminating, the positive features appear to be more positive and the negative 
features to be more negative, and thus the more (less) attractive alternative becomes 
even more (less) attractive. In addition, because the task framing effect was not  
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influenced by the time-pressure manipulation, the accentuation process seems to be 
relatively automatic. 
Accounting for Previous Results 
In this section, I discuss the applicability of this modified accentuation account 
in explaining some of the earlier studies in support of the compatibility account. The 
same logic that the difference under various task frames lies in the amount of available 
cognitive resource can be applied to the choice and matching tasks in Tversky et al.’s 
(1988) study, mentioned in Introduction. For a choice task, the participants only need 
to come up with one of the two alternatives, whereas for a matching task a specific 
number is required. The latter task seems to be more demanding, as the rejection task 
in the selection vs. rejection task pair. So when the participants were told that the 
technical-knowledge attribute was more important, they were better at cooperating this 
information into their decisions in the choice task than in the matching task because 
there is more available cognitive resource in the simpler choice task. This rationale can 
explain why 65% of the participants in the choice task indicated preference for the 
candidate with a higher technical-knowledge score whereas only 34% participants in 
the matching task did so. Note that this study cannot distinguish whether being more 
discriminating in one task than the other is due to the former task involving more 
commitment or being less effortful, because the choice task is less effortful than the 
matching task and also possibly involves more commitment because people need to 
live with the option they choose. 
In Nowlis and Simonson’s (1997) study, each of the two options in the 
problems contained one “comparable” feature and one “enriched” feature, and the 
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comparable feature is easier to compare than the enriched feature. In their example 
problem with two alternative televisions, TV A had a low-quality brand (Magnavox) 
but low price ($209), and TV B had a high-quality brand (Sony) but high price ($309). 
The authors proposed that brand is an enriched feature and price is a comparable 
feature, which are compatible with a rating task and a choice task, respectively. The 
finding was that participants preferred the options with better brands like TV B more in 
the rating task than in the choice task. Using an average of the percentages that one 
option was preferred in both tasks, I obtained the relative attractiveness of this option. 
In all seven of Nowlis and Simonson’s similar experiments, the options like TV B were 
more attractive (M = 56%) than the other options. In other words, participants were 
more discriminating (i.e., preferring the more attractive option like TV B more) in the 
rating task than in the choice task. According to the commitment explanation in the 
accentuation account proposed by Wedell (1997), higher level commitment should be 
involved in the choice task than in the rating task because people will need to live with 
the option they chosen but not the options they made a judgment through rating 
(Ganzach, 1995). In this way, the accentuation account is not able to account for the 
results from Nowlis and Simonson’s study. However, one can assume that the rating 
task is less effortful than the choice task because the rating task involve only one 
option and the choice task requires an evaluation of both options. With this assumption 
proposed in the modified accentuation account, people have more cognitive resources 
available in the rating task to evaluate the features of an option, and thus become more 
discriminating, explaining the results.  
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The cognitive-resource view is also consistent with the compatibility account in 
some circumstances. For example, Slovic et al. (1990) found that when providing both 
market value and rank in market value of companies, participants weighted one of the 
two types of information (e.g., rank) more if they were required to predict the 
companies’ performance for the next year in that type of information (e.g., rank). To 
explain this result in terms of the modified accentuation account, the effort demands for 
the two tasks need to be dependable on both the task and the information used. It is 
easier and less effortful to use the same type of information when making the 
prediction (e.g., to make a prediction on the rank when the ranks are available), which 
is also consistent with the compatibility principle.  
The Compatibility Account 
One possibility why the current study did not obtain a result pattern that fit with 
the compatibility account proposed by Shafir (1993) is that the compatibility effect 
becomes evident only in certain circumstances. As stated by Shafir, “Naturally, 
compatibility effects tend to be mild, and limited in their ability to influence decision” 
(p. 547). The compatibility account explains decision-making processes best when the 
alternatives are otherwise comparable and the decision is difficult. When the 
alternatives are clearly different in terms of attractiveness to the decision maker, 
slightly different weightings of the positive and negative features should not affect the 
final choice. Similar to this idea, in Meloy and Russo’s (2004) experiments that 
supported the compatibility account, the alternatives in each problem were controlled 
to be relatively equal in terms of attractiveness. Thus, the compatibility account may 
explain better for the problems with the options of similar attractiveness, and it may not 
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be able to explain the results considering a broad range of relative attractiveness of the 
alternatives. 
To test this possibility, I checked my data using the way Shafir (1993) analyzed 
his data, by comparing 100% with the sum of the percentage of the enriched option 
being selected (PS) and that of it being rejected (PR). A compatibility effect exists if the 
sum (PS + PR) is significantly greater than 100%, because according to the 
compatibility account the enriched option is preferred more in the selection task than in 
the rejection task (PS > 1 − PR). For each experiment (except Experiment 4), I ranked 
the problems by the relative attractiveness of the enriched option, and took the middle 
third of the problems to compare average of the sum (PS + PR) for the problems with 
those from the first and the last thirds of the problems. In none of the experiments was 
the average sum of the middle third higher than the numbers for the first and last thirds 
of the problems. Averaging across all experiments, the average sum was 94, 98, and 
104 for the first, middle, and last thirds of the problems, respectively. Thus, it seems 
that whether the two options were similar in terms of attractiveness did not affect the 
evidence of the compatibility effect in the current study.  
Compatibility From a Different Perspective 
The compatibility in Shafir’s (1993) account lies between the feature valence 
(positive vs. negative) and the task frame (selection vs. rejection). This compatibility 
relation requires the features within an option to be processed individually and interact 
with the task frame. Another way of looking at the compatibility relation is to treat 
each option as a unit, whose valence interacts with the task frame. These two layers of 
compatibility relation are similar to the element-level and set-level compatibility in the 
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stimulus-response compatibility studies (e.g., Proctor & Wang, 1997).  In this sense of 
option-based compatibility (compared with the previously defined feature-based 
compatibility), a more attractive option is more compatible with the selection task, and 
a less attractive option is more compatible with the rejection task. As a result, this 
option-based compatibility relation predicts that the more attractive options are 
preferred more in the selection task than in the rejection task, and the less attractive 
options are preferred more in the rejection task than in the selection task. This 
prediction fits exactly the data pattern found in the current study and that in Wedell’s 
(1997) study. 
This option-based compatibility account and the accentuation account are not 
mutually exclusive. It can be that the stimulus element that is more compatible with the 
task is weighted more heavily under this specific task than under other tasks, though 
these different weighting effects may not be evident when the options are very 
distinguishable in other aspects. In the meanwhile, some tasks are less effortful than 
others (e.g., selection task compared to rejection task, choice task compared to 
matching task) and people have additional available cognitive resources to focus on the 
decision per se in these less effortful tasks than in others. 
Use of Verbal Protocols 
 In the current study, the verbal-protocol experiment (Experiment 2) 
demonstrated unique result patterns different from all other experiments. First, looking 
at the choice data, it was the only experiment in which the task framing effect was not 
evident. The regression lines for the selection and rejection tasks almost overlapped 
with each other, indicating that participants had similar preference patterns under both 
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task frames. The principle of procedure invariance held in this experiment and the 
participants seemed to be “rational” according to the rational decision making theories. 
Second, in the verbal protocol data, participants tended to follow the compatibility 
principle by mentioning the features that are compatible with the task (e.g., positive 
features in the selection task). The above mentioned result patterns only occurred in 
Experiment 2, not in other experiments even when the task frame was emphasized and 
tested in the online experiments or when the participants were reminded about the task 
and monitored by the experimenter in the laboratory setting (Experiment 5). Thus, 
these patterns are apparently attributable to the task requirement that participants report 
their thoughts verbally while performing the tasks. 
Caution should be taken when using the processing-tracing methods such as the 
verbal protocols and information board (e.g., Mouselab, Bettman, et al., 1990) Verbal 
protocol methods have been shown to influence the decision-making process rather 
than just revealing the process (e.g., Dickson, McLennan, & Omodei, 2000). Glöckner 
and Betsch (2008) compared results obtained using Mouselab with results obtained 
when the information was not restricted to participants, and found that using Mouselab 
introduced limitations in information search and more use of simple, non-
compensatory strategies. The current study also showed that people became more 
“rational” and relied more on deliberative processing when required to verbalize their 
thoughts during the experiment. In addition, the need for verbalization of reasons may 




It was, however, beneficial to conduct an experiment with the verbal protocols method, 
which revealed interesting phenomena that would otherwise difficult to find out. 
Because participants were required to speak out their thoughts, I was able to discover 
that more than half of the participants in the rejection task thought the task was a 
selection one at the beginning. Another finding is that although the features in each 
option were predetermined to have positive, negative, or average values, these values 
could be very different for different participants. As an example, for a problem of 
selecting/rejecting one of two pairs of shoes, some participants thought “it appears as if 
everyone has a pair” was a good feature for shoes because it means the pair of shoes is 
popular for a good reason, but other said it was not good because they did not want to 
wear the same shoes as everyone else does.  
Lessons for Conducting Experiments Online 
The current study utilized both online and laboratory experiments: The online 
experiments provided choice and other response data of larger sample sizes, and the 
laboratory experiments obtained process-tracing data and other observations that are 
not available through online experiments. Conducting experiments online has become a 
complementary way of collecting data in laboratories. It usually works in the situations 
where the instructions are simple enough for participants to follow, the task does not 
require strict control (e.g., sound proofing), or no physical data (e.g., biometric 
measures) to be collected, and the required experimental population is able to and has 
access to internet and computer. Online experiments work better when time, budget, or 
human resource is limited, and a large number of participants is needed, the  
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experiments need to be conducted in multiple locations, or the experiment is related to 
online contents (e.g., webpage design).  
Besides the traditional university subject pool (e.g., the Sona system used in the 
current study), MTurk has become an increasingly popular platform for data collection 
in the areas of psychology and other social sciences in the past ten years (Paolacci, 
Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). It has been concluded that MTurk is a viable alternative 
for data collection, the recruited population is relatively representative of the U.S. 
population, and the workers pay at least as much attention as participants from other 
platforms (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Paolacci et al., 2010). 
To ensure that the MTurk participants did not just rush through the task without 
paying attention or with an implicit time pressure to respond fast, I included an 
experiment in which the participants were forced to wait a certain amount of time 
(mean RT in an earlier experiment) before they were able to respond. A comparison 
between this experiment and a “usual” one without any timing manipulation would tell 
how the participants were doing in the usual experiments. It turned out that participants 
in both experiments used roughly similar amounts of time to finish the task and 
demonstrated similar result patterns. In addition, there were answers which were given 
only in a couple of seconds in the online experiments, which meant the participants did 
not even finish reading (part of) the contents before they responded. This type of fast 
response may be due to the participants not paying attention or just clicking on the 
“next” button mistakenly. In the analyses of all my online experiments, I included an 
RT cutoff to exclude this type of outliers to get cleaner data. In addition, a practice 
question with clear right or wrong answers was presented at the beginning of the online 
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experiments to help participants understand the task.  I would argue that these types of 
manipulation and comparison are necessary in conducting online experiments, 
especially when a timing manipulation is involved. Inserting several questions similar 
to the practice question throughout the experiment will also help to screen out 
participants who do not understand the task or do not follow the instructions. 
Directions for Future Research 
Wedell’s (1997) accentuation account proposes that “greater commitment or 
need for justification in choice” (p. 874) leads to more accentuation in the selection 
task than in the rejection task. My modified version of the accentuation account 
proposes that available cognitive resources may be a critical factor that yields the 
difference between the two tasks. Neither Wedell’s study or the current study measured 
level of commitment or need for justification directly in the tasks, and my inference 
that the rejection task is more effortful than the selection task is based on the 
performance data in the practice questions, the decision-time data, and the eye-tracking 
data. A possible direction for future studies is to measure directly the level of 
commitment or need for justification for the different tasks, and how effortful the tasks 
are. 
The current study employed an information-processing approach to understand 
how people make decisions under different task frames. A pattern informed by the 
modified version of the accentuation account is that people evaluate the positive 
features to be more positive and the negative ones more negative. One question the 
current study did not answer directly is: What are the decision-making strategies 
people use when performing the tasks? Future studies can test the possible strategies 
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(e.g., compensatory vs. non-compensatory strategies; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; 
Sütterlin, Brunner, & Opwis, 2008) people use, especially whether people use different 
strategies under different task frames and under different time-constrained situations.  
The task framing effect studied in this dissertation can be applied to a number 
of tasks other than the daily-life problems used in the current experiments (e.g., to 
select a school to attend; to decide which product to return). For example, in the 
cybersecurity field, people usually need to perform certain tasks to permit or deny the 
use of their personal data depending on the default privacy setting (e.g., Lai & Hui, 
2006), and people using smart devices often need to install or uninstall an application 
given various features of an application (e.g., Chen et al., 2014). Future studies can 
focus on investigating how different task frames influence people’s decision making in 
these specific situations, and how to maintain better privacy and security in the cyber 












The current study provided evidence for the task framing effect that the 
selection versus rejection task frames influence the decision makers’ preferences. 
People preferred the more (less) attractive option more (less) in the selection task than 
in the rejection, and this task framing effect was not influenced by time pressure. This 
result pattern supports the accentuation account (Wedell, 1997) that people are more 
discriminating in the selection task than in the rejection task.  
In terms of theoretical contribution, I proposed a modified version of the 
accentuation account: Compared to those under the selection task frame, people under 
the rejection task frame have less cognitive resources available for discriminating the 
alternatives; the accentuation process makes evaluation of the positive (negative) 
features more positive (negative), and it seems to be automatic. I also discussed the 
implications of the current finding for the compatibility account. An option-level 
compatibility account rather than the feature-level compatibility account is consistent 
with the current finding, and previous studies supporting the compatibility account 
could possibly be explained in terms of the modified accentuation account. 
In terms of methodological contribution, this study demonstrated a case of 
combining and comparing data from online and laboratory experiments, by collecting 
large-sample data online and obtaining information-processing patterns in the 
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laboratory. In addition, I provided recommendations for conducting experiments 
involving different task frames online to make sure and/or examine whether 
participants understand the task frame as intended by the experimenter: To include a 
practice question with proper feedback at the beginning and a test question regarding 
the task frame at the end of the experiment.  
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Figure 3. The proportions of the enriched option being preferred in selection and 
rejection tasks as a function of the overall proportion preferring the enriched option 
(top panel) and of the relative attractiveness rating of the enriched option (bottom 





















































































Figure 4. The proportions of the enriched option being preferred in selection and 
rejection tasks as a function of the overall proportion preferring the enriched option 
(top panel) and of the relative attractiveness rating of the enriched option (bottom 
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Figure 10. The proportions of the enriched option being preferred in selection and 
rejection tasks as a function of the overall proportion preferring the enriched option 
(top panel) and of the relative attractiveness rating of the enriched option (bottom 





















































































Figure 11. The proportions of the enriched option being preferred in selection and 
rejection tasks as a function of the overall proportion preferring the enriched option 
(top panel) and of the relative attractiveness rating of the enriched option (bottom 




















































































Figure 12. The proportions of the enriched option being preferred in selection and 
rejection tasks as a function of the overall proportion preferring the enriched option 
(top panel) and of the relative attractiveness rating of the enriched option (bottom 





















































































Figure 13. The proportions of the enriched option being preferred in selection and 
rejection tasks as a function of the overall proportion preferring the enriched option 
(top panel) and of the relative attractiveness rating of the enriched option (bottom 





















































































Figure 14. The proportions of the enriched option being preferred in selection and 
rejection tasks as a function of the overall proportion preferring the enriched option 
(top panel) and of the relative attractiveness rating of the enriched option (bottom 

















































































Materials Used in the Experiments 
The first 26 problems were taken from Wedell (1997). The last four problems were 
created similar to the gamble problems used in Shafir (1993). 
Stimulus 
Topic 




Parent A has an above-average income, a very close 
relationship with the child, an extremely active 
social life, lots of work related travel, and minor 
health problems. 
Impoverished 
Parent B has an average income, average health, 
average working hours, a reasonable rapport with the 
child, and a relatively stable social life. 
Vacation 
Enriched 
Spot A has lots of sunshine, gorgeous beaches and 
coral reefs, an ultra modern hotel, cold water, and 
limited nightlife. 
Impoverished 
Spot B has average weather, average beaches, a 
medium-quality hotel, medium-temperature water, 




Candidate A served honorably as the vice president 
of the council last term. He organized a fund raiser 
to support the local children's hospital. He was voted 
"Most Intelligent" in high school. He enrolled as an 
art student in college, but dropped out. He has been 
divorced once. 
Impoverished 
Candidate B enjoys camping and other outdoor 
activities. He is a local business man. In high school, 
he was voted "most enthusiastic." He majored in 
history in college. He has two children enrolled in 
the local elementary school. 
Course 
Enriched 
Professor A is very enthusiastic and really gets 
excited about the course, is often very humorous, has 
you write two papers a week, is a hard grader but 
gives lots of useful feedback. 
Impoverished 
Professor B is fairly interesting, speaks clearly, 
requires that you write one paper a week, and 




Company A has a high starting salary, full health 
insurance coverage, a good vacation plan, limited 
opportunity for quick advancement, and has recently 
laid off some staff. 
Impoverished 
Company B has an average starting salary, an 
adequate health insurance plan, a reasonable number 
of paid holidays, some opportunity for advancement, 
and a stable work environment. 
Road Trip 
Enriched 
Vehicle A has abundant seating space, an excellent 
road-side assistance plan, free insurance coverage, a 
beat-up interior, and fairly poor gas mileage. 
Impoverished 
Vehicle B has adequate seating space, average 
interior condition, moderate cost daily insurance, 
average gas mileage, and a limited road-side 
assistance plan. 
Social Club Enriched 
Club A has a high rate of member participation, a 
variety of planned activities, requires only a small 
time commitment, has a low level of group 
cohesiveness, and participation in the different 
activities can get expensive. 
115 
Impoverished 
Club B has average member participation, average 
number of planned activities, moderate level of 
group cohesiveness, moderate amount of time 
commitment, and is affordable to join. 
Apartment 
Enriched 
Apartment A has lower than average rent per month, 
located in a quiet community, all new, modern 
appliances, extended driving time to work due to 
traffic, and small bedrooms and closets. 
Impoverished 
Apartment B has an average rent per month, 
moderate noise level from neighbors, adequate 
appliances, average driving time to work, and an 
adequate number of parking spaces available. 
Ski Trip 
Enriched 
Ski resort A has fantastic powder snow, a free ski 
lesson, top quality rental skis, expensive lift tickets, 
and long lift lines. 
Impoverished 
Ski spot B has average snow condition, average 
price lift ticket, rental skis of reasonable quality, 





Restaurant A has very exotic atmosphere, great 
tasting food, lots of different items on the menu, 
high prices, and long waits. 
Impoverished 
Restaurant B has moderate atmosphere, ordinary 
food, average prices, fair service, and a variety of 
items on the menu. 
Cars I 
Enriched 
Car A has a 36,000-mile bumper-to-bumper 
inclusive warranty, a high-performance engine, full 
option package, high insurance costs, and poorer 
than average gas mileage. 
Impoverished 
Car B has a 36,000-mile warranty on major engine 
components, a standard engine, a standard option 
package, average gas mileage, and average insurance 
premiums. 
Video Club Enriched 
Club A has a very wide selection, covers all of your 
favorite titles, very quick response to the newly 




Club B has moderate variety of selections, decent 
rental prices, some titles of interest to you, fairly fast 
rental of new movie releases, and some bonus 
coupons from time to time. 
Day Care 
Enriched 
Center A is close to your home and work, has a 
highly qualified staff, large class sizes, a tiny 
playground, is expensive, and requires participation 
in activities that are expensive. 
Impoverished 
Center A is close to your home and work, has a 
highly qualified staff, large class sizes, a tiny 
playground, is expensive, and requires participation 
in activities that are expensive. 
Health Club Enriched 
Club A has many modern weight machines, is open 
extended hours, provides sauna/pool privileges, is 
expensive, the exercise classes are crowded, and 
there are few trainers available for assistance. 
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Impoverished Club B has a moderate number of exercise classes, is 
competitively priced, has an average number of 
weight machines, is in a fairly modern building, has 
an average number of trainers available to assist you, 
and is open during regular business hours. 
Cars 2 
Enriched 
Car A has many safety features and is fully "loaded," 
is very fuel efficient, requires high insurance 
premiums, and has little trunk space. 
Impoverished 
Car B has an average number of safety features, is 
moderately fuel efficient and equipped with standard 




House A is in a very good neighborhood, is very 
large, is close to work/schools, has high property 
taxes, a small yard, and is in need of numerous 
repairs. 
Impoverished 
House B is in an average neighborhood, has a 
medium-sized yard, is fairly close to your place of 




Concert A has front-row seats, has three top bands, 
there is a very long wait to get into the arena, it is a 
long drive to get to the concert, and none of your 
friends are going. 
Impoverished 
Concert B has average seats, the arena is a moderate 
distance from your home, some of your friends are 
attending, there is an average wait to get into the 
area, and has one top band. 
Doctors 
Enriched 
Doctor A is very experienced and extremely well 
respected in the community, has an excellent 
"bedside manner," there is often a long wait in the 
waiting room, and the office is not convenient to 
your home and work. 
Impoverished 
Doctor B has an average wait in the office, a good 
reputation in the community, an average "bedside 
manner," is a moderate distance from your home and 




Offer A has a high salary, offers a long paid vacation 
each year in addition to holidays, has a very good 
benefit package, requires some overtime work, and 
has a moderately high stress level. 
Impoverished 
Offer A has a high salary, offers a long paid vacation 
each year in addition to holidays, has a very good 
benefit package, requires some overtime work, and 
has a moderately high stress level. 
Colognes 
Enriched 
Brand A has a unique, exquisite scent, is contained 
in a large bottle, comes in a box with a 
complimentary gift, is high in price, and the scent 
can sometimes make people sneeze. 
Impoverished 
Brand B has a nice scent, is contained in an average 
size bottle, comes in a box, is moderately priced, and 
you have a normal reaction to the scent. 
Vacations Enriched 
Option A is almost always sunny, offers a lot of 
cultural diversity, is nestled between the beach and 
mountains, has several added expenses, and is prone 
to high humidity 
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Impoverished 
Option B has a temperate climate, some culture 
diversity, average number of attractions, variety of 




Date A is honest, intelligent, seeks adventure, doesn't 
have much free time, and has a habit of being late. 
Impoverished 
Date B has a nice personality, average sense of 




University A has a beautiful campus, lower than 
average tuition, high job placement record, is located 
more than thirty miles from any substantial cities, 
has a reputation for difficult classes, and has a high 
first-year failure rate. 
Impoverished 
University B has a reasonable tuition, average 
number of students per educator, offers a variety of 
degrees, and is a moderately sized campus that is 




Pair A comes with a warrantee, they are highly 
stylish and match everything. However, they have a 
high price and they wear out quick. 
Impoverished 
Pair B holds up okay, has an average price, no 
warrantee, they offer moderate support, and it 
appears as if everyone has a pair. 
Toothpastes 
Enriched 
Brand A is tartar control formula, with baking soda 
and fluoride recommended by dentists. It comes in a 
no-mess stand-up tube, is expensive, and another 
customer tells you it doesn't have much flavor. 
Impoverished 
Brand B has a mint flavor, an average price, contains 
fluoride, comes in a standard tube, and another 
customer claims to use it. 
Computers 
Enriched 
Computer A has a 2-year warranty, extensive 
memory, is cheap, is rather slow in processing speed, 
and comes with almost no software. 
Impoverished 
Computer A is moderately priced, has a 3-month 
warranty, reasonable memory, is midrange in speed, 




You have a 60% chance to win $80, and a 40% 
chance to lose $10. 
Impoverished 




You have a 50% chance to win $80, and a 50% 
chance to lose $60. 
Impoverished 




You have a 40% chance to win $10, and a 60% 
chance to lose $80. 
Impoverished 




You have a 50% chance to win $60, and a 50% 
chance to lose $80. 
Impoverished 








Results on Subjective Ratings 
Experiment 1 
For satisfaction rating, there were main effects of feature order (Ms = 7.74 vs. 
7.51 for the positive-negative and negative-positive feature orders, respectively), F(1, 
29) = 32.16, p < .001, ηp
2 = .53, and task frame (Ms = 7.73 vs, 7.52 for selection and 
rejection tasks, respectively), F(1, 29) = 14.38, p = .001, ηp
2 = .33, and an interaction 
between the two factors, F(1, 29) = 27.88, p < .001, ηp
2 = .49. For positive-negative 
feature order, satisfaction rating was 7.94 for the selection task and 7.54 for the 
rejection task; for negative-positive feature order, satisfaction rating was 7.51 for both 
the selection and the rejection task. 
For confidence rating, there were main effects of feature order (Ms = 7.75 vs. 
7.60), F(1, 29) = 15.22, p = .001, ηp
2 = .34, and task frame (Ms = 7.82 vs. 7.54), F(1, 
29) = 34.26, p < .001, ηp
2 = .54, and an interaction between the two factors, F(1, 29) = 
15.58, p < .001, ηp
2 = .35. For positive-negative feature order, confidence rating was 
7.97 for the selection task and 7.53 for the rejection task; for negative-positive feature 
order, confidence rating was 7.66 for the selection and 7.55 for the rejection task. 
Experiment 2 
Regarding the satisfaction rating, the main effects of task frame (Ms = 8.16 vs. 
8.53 for selection and rejection tasks, respectively), F(1, 29) = 42.34, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .59, and feature order (Ms = 8.22 vs. 8.47 for positive-negative and negative-positive 
feature orders, respectively) were significant, F(1, 29) = 15.99, p < .001, ηp
2 = .36, and 
the interaction between them was also significant, F(1, 29) = 62.67, p < .001, ηp
2 = .68. 
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Participants in the selection task had a higher rating when the negative features were 
presented above the positive features than the other way around (Ms = 8.61vs. 7.70), 
whereas those in the rejection task rated their satisfaction higher when the positive 
features were presented above the negative features (Ms = 8.74 vs. 8.34). 
In terms of the confidence rating, the main effects of task frame (Ms = 8.24 vs. 
8.52 for selection and rejection tasks, respectively), F(1, 29) = 14.56, p = .001, ηp
2 
= .33, and feature order (Ms = 8.17 vs. 8.59 for positive-negative and negative-positive 
feature orders, respectively) were significant, F(1, 29) = 34.17, p < .001, ηp
2 = .54, and 
the interaction between them was also significant, F(1, 29) = 46.89, p < .001, ηp
2 = .62. 
Participants in the selection task had a higher rating when the negative features were 
presented above the positive features than the other way around (Ms = 8.76 vs. 7.71), 
whereas those in the rejection task rated their confidence higher when the positive 
features were presented above the negative features (Ms = 8.63 vs. 8.41). 
Experiment 3A 
For satisfaction rating, there significant factors were a main effect of feature 
order (Ms = 8.07 vs. 7.99), F(1, 29) = 6.03, p = .020, ηp
2 = .17, and an interaction 
between feature order and task frame, F(1, 29) = 8.38, p = .007, ηp
2 = .22. For positive-
negative feature order, satisfaction rating was 7.99 for the selection task and 8.15 for 
the rejection task; for negative-positive feature order, satisfaction rating was 8.00 for 
the selection and 7.98 for the rejection task. The main effect of task frame was not 
significant, F(1, 29) = 1.45, p = .239, ηp
2 = .05. 
For confidence rating, the significant factors were a main effect of task frame 
(Ms = 7.99 vs. 8.13), F(1, 29) = 7.27, p = .012, ηp
2 = .20, and an interaction between 
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task frame and feature order, F(1, 29) = 7.11, p = .012, ηp
2 = .20. For positive-negative 
feature order, confidence rating was 7.99 for the selection task and 8.20 for the 
rejection task; for negative-positive feature order, confidence rating was 8.00 for the 
selection and 8.01 for the rejection task. The main effect of feature order was 
approaching the .05 significance level (Ms = 8.00 vs. 7.60), F(1, 29) = 4.08, p = .053, 
ηp
2 = .12. 
Experiment 3B 
For satisfaction rating, a main effect of task frame (Ms = 7.74 vs. 7.48 for the 
selection and rejection tasks, respectively) was the only significant factor, F(1, 29) = 
29.30, p < .001, ηp
2 = .50. The main effect of feature order was not significant, F(1, 29) 
= 0.45, p = .507, ηp
2 = .02, nor was the interaction between the two, F(1, 29) = 2.13, p 
= .155, ηp
2 = .07.  For confidence rating, there was again only a main effect of task 
frame (Ms = 7.79 vs. 7.50 for the selection and rejection tasks, respectively), F(1, 29) = 
49.74, p < .001, ηp
2 = .63. The main effect of feature order was not significant, F(1, 29) 
= 0.24, p = .626, ηp
2 = .01, neither was the interaction between the two, F(1, 29) = 1.59, 
p = .218, ηp
2 = .05. 
Experiment 6 
For satisfaction rating, only the interaction between feature order and task 
frame was significant, F(1, 27) = 44.21, p < .001, ηp
2 = .62. For positive-negative 
feature order, satisfaction rating was 6.94 for the selection task and 7.26 for the 
rejection task; for negative-positive feature order, satisfaction rating was 7.12 for the 
selection and 6.84 for the rejection task. The main effects of task frame, F(1, 29) =  
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0.06, p = .804, ηp
2 = .00, and feature order were not significant, F(1, 27) = 3.10, p 
= .090, ηp
2 = .10. 
For confidence rating, there was an interaction between feature order and task 
frame, F(1, 27) = 42.11, p < .001, ηp
2 = .61. For positive-negative feature order, 
satisfaction rating was 6.79 for the selection task and 7.09 for the rejection task; for 
negative-positive feature order, satisfaction rating was 7.01 for the selection and 6.72 
for the rejection task. The main effects of task frame, F(1, 29) = 0.00, p = .957, ηp
2 
= .00, and feature order were not significant, F(1, 27) = 1.37, p = .253, ηp
2 = .05. 
Experiment 7 
For satisfaction and confidence ratings, the only effects that were approaching 
significance was for the confidence rating: the main effect of task frame (Ms = 7.88 vs. 
7.96 for selection and rejection tasks, respectively), F(1, 29) = 3.77, p = .062, ηp
2 = .12, 
and the interaction between feature order and task frame, F(1, 29) = 3.51, p = .071, ηp
2 
= .11. For positive-negative feature order, confidence rating was 7.84 for the selection 
task and 7.99 for the rejection task; for negative-positive feature order, satisfaction 
rating was 7.92 for both tasks. No other effects approached the .05 level significance, 



















 Ph.D., Cognitive Psychology 2015 
 Purdue University                                                                                   (anticipated) 
 M.S., Industrial Engineering 2015 
 Purdue University  
 M.Ed., Cognitive Psychology 2010 
 Zhejiang University  
 B.S., Psychology 2007 
 Zhejiang University  
 
Honors and Awards 
 
Women in CyberSecurity (WiCyS 2015) Student Scholarship (2015) 
Purdue University Graduate School Fellowship Incentive Grant (2015) 
American Psychological Association Dissertation Research Award (2014) 
Purdue University Bilsland Dissertation Fellowship (2014−2015) 
College of Health and Human Sciences Compton Graduate Research Travel 
Award (2014) 
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Student Author Presentation Support 
Award (2014) 
Psychological Sciences Department Award for Graduate Research Innovation 
(2014) 
Psychological Sciences Department Graduate Research Publication Award (2014) 
Student Member with Honors of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 
(2013) 
School of Industrial Engineering GSO Research Symposium Poster Contest 
(2013) 
C. Eugene Walker Outstanding Graduate Student Department Award (2013) 
Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Student Conferenceship 
(2012) 
Purdue Graduate Student Government Travel Grant (2012) 
  
129 
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society COTG Student Travel Honorarium 
(2012) 
Purdue University Frederick N. Andrews Fellowship (2010−2012) 
Zhejiang University Chen Li Scholarship for Graduate Student (2009) 
Triple A Graduate Student, Excellent Social Work Scholarship (2008) 
Excellent Undergraduate Thesis of Zhejiang University (2007) 
Excellent Graduate of Zhejiang Province (2007) 
Zhejiang University Chen Li Scholarship for Undergraduate Student (2006) 
Second-Class National Scholarship for Undergraduate (2004) 
First-Class Excellent Academic Scholarship (2003−2006) 
 
Peer Reviewed Journal Articles 
 
Proctor, R. W. & Chen, J. (in press; invited paper). The role of human 
factors/ergonomics in the science of security: Decision making and action 
selection in cyberspace. Human Factors. 
Yamaguchi, M., Chen, J., & Proctor, R. W. (in press). Transfer of learning in 
choice reactions: The roles of stimulus type, response mode, and set-level 
compatibility. Memory & Cognition. 
Chen, J., Gates, C., Li, N., & Proctor, R. W. (2015). Influence of risk/safety 
information framing on android app-selection decisions. Journal of Cognitive 
Engineering and Decision Making, 9, 149–168. 
Chen, J., & Proctor, R. W. (2015). Influence of response-effect feedback on 
learning and performance of a complex key-pressing task: Morin and Grant 
(1955) revisited. American Journal of Psychology, 128, 197-208. 
Chen, J., & Proctor, R. W. (2014). Conceptual response distance and intervening 
keys distinguish action goals in the Stroop color-identification task. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 21, 1238-1243. 
Gates, C., Chen, J., Li, N., & Proctor, R. W. (2014). Effective risk communication 
for Android Apps. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure 
Computing, 11, 252-265. 
Song, X., Chen, J., & Proctor, R.W. (2014). Correspondence effects with torches: 
Grasping affordance or visual feature asymmetry? Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 67, 665-675. 
Baroni, G., Yamaguchi, M., Chen, J., & Proctor, R. W. (2013). Mechanisms 
underlying transfer of task-defined rules across feature dimensions. 
Experimental Psychology, 60, 410-424. 
Chen, J., & Proctor, R. W. (2013). Response-effect compatibility defines the 
natural scrolling direction. Human Factors, 55, 1112-1129. 
Chen, J., & Proctor, R. W. (2012). Influence of category identity on letter 
matching: Conceptual penetration of visual processing or response 
competition? Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 74, 716-729. 
Proctor, R. W., & Chen, J. (2012). Dissociating influences of key and hand 




Chen, J., Zhou, J., Cui, Y., & Shen, M. (2009). Visual masking effect depends on 
the perceived locations of objects. Chinese Journal of Applied Psychology, 
15, 291-297. 
Gao, Z., Shui, R., Chen, J., Chen, W., Tian, Y., & Shen, M. (2009). The 
mechanism of negative numbers’ spatial representation. Acta Psychologica 
Sinica, 41, 95-102. 
Shen, M., Shen, Y., Liang, J., Qiao, Y., Chen, J., Chen, W., & Chen, S. (2008). 
IM usage experience and the model with usage motivation and preference. 
Chinese Journal of Applied Psychology, 14, 195-202. 
 
Peer Reviewed Conference Proceedings 
 
Jorgenson, Z., Chen, J., Gates, C., Li, N., Yu, T., & Proctor, R. W. (2015). 
Understanding and communicating risk for mobile applications. In 
Proceedings of Fifth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and 
Privacy (pp. 49-60). New York, NY: ACM.  
Chen, J., Gates, C., Li, N., & Proctor, R. W. (2014). Framing of summary 
risk/safety information and app selection. In Proceedings of the Human 
Factors and Ergonomics Society 58th Annual Meeting (pp. 1461-1465). Santa 
Monica, CA: HFES.  
Chen, J., & Proctor, R. W. (2012). Up or down: Directional stimulus-response 
compatibility and natural scrolling. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society 56th Annual Meeting (pp.1381-1385). Santa Monica, 
CA: HFES.  
Gates, C., Li, N., Chen, J., & Proctor, R. W. (2012). CodeShield: Towards 
personalized application whitelisting. In Proceedings of the 28th Annual 





Chen, J., Yang, W., Xiong, A., Li, N., & Proctor, R. W. (2015). Warning Users of 
Phishing Attacks with a Google Chrome Extension. Talk presented at Human-
Computer Interaction International 2015, Los Angeles, CA. 
Proctor, R. W., Chen, J., Gates, C., Li, N., Jorgensen, Z., & Yu, T. (2015). 
Displaying Major Risks Factors Associated with Android Apps. Talk 
presented at 6th International Conference on Applied Human Factors and 
Ergonomics, Las Vegas, NV. 
Yang, W., Chen, J., Xiong, A., Proctor, R. W., & Li, N. (2015). Effectiveness of a 
Phishing Warning in Field Settings. Poster presented at Symposium and 
Bootcamp on the Science of Security (HotSoS), Urbana, IL. 
Chen, H., Chowdhury, O., Chen, J., Li, N., & Proctor, R. W. (2015). Towards 
Quantification of Firewall Policy Complexity. Poster presented at Symposium 
and Bootcamp on the Science of Security (HotSoS), Urbana, IL. 
  
131 
Chen, J., Gates, C., Jorgensen, Z., Yang, W., Xiong, A., Li, N., Yu, & Proctor, R. 
W. (2015). Effective Risk Communication for End Users: A Multi-granularity 
Approach. Poster presented at the Women in CyberSecurity (WiCyS) 
Conference, Atlanta, GA.  
Chen, J., Gates, C., Li, N., & Proctor, R. W. (2014). Framing of Summary 
Risk/Safety Information and App Selection. Talk presented at 58thAnnual 
Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, Chicago, IL. 
Chen, J., Gates, C., Li, N., & Proctor, R. W. (2014). Effective Communication of 
Risks for Android Apps: Influence of Summary Risk Information and 
Framing. Talk presented at 44th Annual Meeting of the Society for Computers 
in Psychology (SCiP), Long Beach, CA. 
Chen, J., & Proctor, R. W. (2014). Morin and Grant (1955) Revisited: Influence 
of Action-Effect Feedback on Learning. Poster presented at 55th Annual 
Meeting of the Psychonomic Society, Long Beach, CA. 
Chen, J., Gates, C., Li, N., & Proctor, R. W. (2014). Decision Making in Android 
App Selection: Influence of Risk/Safety Framing. Poster presented at 55th 
Annual Meeting of the Psychonomic Society, Long Beach, CA. 
Chen, J., Song, X., & Proctor, R. W. (2013). Grasping Affordance or Feature 
Asymmetry in Correspondence Effects for Flashlights. Poster presented at 
54th Annual Meeting of the Psychonomic Society, Toronto, Canada. 
Chen, J., & Proctor, R. W. (2013). Intuitive Design for Non-touch Screen 
Scrolling: Evidence from a Continuous Text-movement Task. Paper presented 
at HCI International 2013, Las Vegas, NV. 
Chen, J., Gates, C., Li, N., & Proctor, R. W. (2013). Summary Risk Information 
Improves App Selection Decisions. Poster presented at the IE GSO 
Symposium 2013. 
Gates, C., & Chen, J. (presenter), Li, N., & Proctor, R. W. (2013). Effective Risk 
Communication for Android Apps. Poster presented at the CERIAS (Center 
for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security) 2013 
Symposium. 
Chen, J., & Proctor, R. W. (2012). Up or Down: Directional Stimulus-Response 
Compatibility and Natural Scrolling. Talk given at 56thAnnual Meeting of the 
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, Boston, MA. 
Chen, J., & Proctor, R. W. (2012). A Conceptual Response-Distance Effect for the 
Stroop Task. Poster presented at 53rd Annual Meeting of the Psychonomic 
Society, Minneapolis, IN. 
Chen, J., & Proctor, R. W. (2012). Key Distance not Hand Distance Influences 
the Stroop Color-Identification Effect. Poster presented at 24th Annual 
Meeting of the Association for Psychological Science, Chicago, IL. 
Chen, J., & Proctor, R. W. (2012). The Response Distance Effect in the Stroop 
Color-Identification Task: Key or Hand Separation? Poster presented at 
Midwest Cognitive Science Conference, Bloomington, IN. 
Chen, J., & Proctor, R. W. (2011). Influence of Name-Identity on Physical same-
Different Letter Matching. Poster presented at 52ndAnnual Meeting of the 
Psychonomic Society, Seattle, WA. 
  
132 
Chen, J. (2008). A Review of Psychological Distance and Construal Level Theory. 
Paper presented at 4th Academic Conference of Graduate Students in the 




Supervised Undergraduate Research, 32 students 2010-2015 
 
Human Factors in Engineering (PSY/IE 577) Spring 2012 
Teaching Assistant (gave 1 lecture)  
Instructor: Dr. Robert W. Proctor 
 
Human Factors in Engineering (PSY/IE 577) Fall 2011 
Teaching Assistant (gave 2 lectures)  
Instructor: Dr. Robert W. Proctor 
 
Introduction to Cognitive Psychology (PSY 200) Spring 2011 
Teaching Assistant 
Instructor: Dr. Gregory Francis 
 
Human Factors in Engineering (PSY/IE 577) Fall 2010 
Teaching Assistant  




 American Psychological Association  
  Student member; Divisions 3 & 21 member 
 Human Factors and Ergonomics Society  
  Student member; 2012 & 2014 annual meeting student volunteer 
 HFES Purdue Student Chapter 
  Student member; Communication Director, 2012−2014 
 Association for Psychological Science  
  Student member; Campus Representative, 2012−present 
 
Ad hoc Reviews 
 
 American Journal of Psychology 
 Journal of Cognitive Psychology 






 Research featured by National Science Foundation (NSF) Discoveries  
  - Experts identify easy way to improve smartphone security 
  - http://www.nsf.gov/discoveries/disc_summ.jsp?cntn_id=133144 
 
